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THE FORUM.
VOL. VIII. JUNE, 1904. No. 9.
ADDRESS OF HAMPTON L. CARSON.
Mr. President, and Members of the Graduating Class of the Dickinson
School of Law, I consider it a privilege to have the opportunity of deliver-
ing a Baccalaureate address in a College whose sons have become so dis-
tinguished in both public and private life, and whose Dean has handsomely
paid the debt which both Lord Coke and Lord Bacon have said every lawyer
owes to his profession., It is difficult to select a topic appropriate to such
an address, and instead of a technical subject, requiring a technical treat-
ment, I prefer to give you a familiar talk on lines which I hope will prove
useful to you as young members of the profession.
You have completed your studies after three years of close attention
to legal principles, and in whatever fields you see fit to employ your
energies, you will quite naturally find yourselves embarrassed by the lack of
practical information or knowledge of those details which are so essential to
successful practice. I have thought I might serve as your friend,-
sincerely your friend,-if I indicate in a very informal way some line of
study which will furnish serious labor during those hours when you are
waiting for the employment which sooner or later will come to the indus-
trious and determined man. I have always thought that much of the time
which hangs heavily on the hands of the young lawyer while waiting for
clients should be used profitably by being used systematically. Your
natural impulse will be to throw yourselves almost instantly into practice,
and you will chafe with a not unnatural impatience if early opportunity is
not given to you to exert your talents and your learning, but remember that
those hours which you consider wasted are, after all, but a part of your
professional discipline. I know of no calamity which can overtake any
young lawyer, which will more seriously impede his real progress in the
profession, than getting too early into practice. You are not ready for it. You
cannot profitably or wisely advise your clients until you have had some pre-
liminary training in the very line which, in the absence of experience, you
are not fully fitted to follow. I think that the most useful schooling and
the most useful kind of employment to which any young lawyer can address
himself during the first five yearg is to thoroughly acquaint himself with the
Prothonotary's office, or the of'.,e of the Clerk of the Courts, or by whatever
title it may be known, in whatever field of labor you select. I do not
know whether you are all Pennsylvanians, or whether you intend to prac-
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tice in this State, but let me assume that the majority of you are Pennsyl-
vanians, and intend to practice here, and the same principle will apply if
you select a more distant State, even if you go to the Pacific Coast, and that
is that you shall at a very early moment devote at least two hours of everyday
to self training in the technical work of the offices of the Prothonotary of the
Court of Common Pleas, and of the Clerk of the Orphan's Court. Lord Coke,
who was the wisest lawyer of his age, and whose wisdom was so abundant
that it furnishes a fund for our instruction to-day, said that a good lawyer
should be a good Prothonotary. No one ought to be satisfied with having
a clerk prepare papers, but he should make himself as familiar with the clerical
duties of the Prothonotary's office as though he himself were the Prothono-
tary's clerk. If you happen to go to one of the large cities,-I am a mem-
ber of the Philadelphia Bar and naturally have the Prothonotary's office of
Philadelphia county in mind; if you happen to go there, you would find
such a long line of men pressing for attention at the clerk's desk, that if in
the case of a sudden emergency, where upon your diligence and your
promptness depended the issue of process in the nature of an attachment to
seize property in advance of others representing similar claims, you- would
find yourselves very much at a loss and at a great disadvantage, if you were
not able, asking the clerk for blanks, to fill out those blanks for yourselves
with perfect accuracy.
Then you are to make yourselves familiar with the Appearance
Docket, which is the general legal ledger of the Prothonotary,
.which, in a bookkeeping system, would bear the same relation to his busi-
ness which a general ledger in a mercantile house does to the affairs of a
firm. If you open that book you will find stated in regular order, the
names of the counsel representing the plaintiff, the names of the counsel
representing the defendant, the court in which the case is brought, the term
and number of the case, and the character of the case, whether at common
law or in equity. You will find in that way an easy index to the proceed-
ings in the case. Make an intelligent selection, taking the very best cases.
Run your eyes down the names of counsel until they rest upon names
familiar to you as those of leaders of the profession, men who thoroughly
understand their business, and who are masters of the technique of practice.
Select those. Take a sample case, say, for instance, an action on a promis-
sory note, or an action on a book account, or an action on a mortgage;
pass then to one of trespass or pick out an action of replevin or of trover
and conversion, and observe how a master practices at the present time, how
he institutes his suit, how it is conducted, what papers he files, in what
form those papers are filed, and how the other side meets the allegations of
the plaintiff. With your own hands carefully transcribe the entries which
appear upon the Appearance Docket; then yon will have in your own
office, for your own study at your leisure, an exact transcript of a public
docket. Go then to the original records as filed with the custodian of the
records; there you will see the writ which brought the defendant into
court. Observe exactly the nature of the return made by the Sheriff, and
whether it is within the terms of the Act of Assembly or otherwise. See
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whether the defendant has appeared. Look at the precise form of the state-
ment of the cause of action; observe whether or not there has been a rule
taken, if the case is a proper one for judgment for want of an affidavit of
defense; see whether the affidavit, if there be one, has been filed within the
proper time; copy the affidavit; see whether the affidavit has been tested by
placing on the motion list of the Court a rule for judgment; observe
whether the Court has entered such a judgment, and follow the case up to
the Supreme Court through all the stages. Thus in course of time you will
have in your own hands a form book of your own creation, patterned upon
the most approved models and sanctioned by the most eminent names at the
Bar. Now go further; take equity cases; select a bill for the adjustment
of matters disputed between partners, or a bill for an injunction, or to en-
force a trust. Abstract this bill for yourself, read the answer, follow it
either in its reference to a Master or, if it is before the Court acting as a
referee, seek for the original evidence, and observe exactly how the issue
has been supported by evidence, and Wvhat result is reached by the Court.
I have often asked young lawyers who have come to me, "Do you
think you are fit for practice; what do you know about the Prothonotary's
office? You ask me whether I have a place for you in my own office? My
first question to you is, what do you know about the Prothonotary's office?"
The candid answer is, "I know nothing." "What steps have you taken to
inform yourself?" "None." "What have you been doing with your
time?" "Sitting in my office and waiting for somebody to come." "Don't
you think you have wasted a great deal of useful time?" "Perhaps I have,
but I really do not know what else to do." "Has it ever occurred to you
that in the City Hall where the Prothonotary's office is open, there is the
place where a lawyer can get his best experience? you know thlat your
brothers in the medical profession are eager to obtain places on the hospital
staff, and attend clinics; why don't you attend legal clinics?" Perhaps a
young man replies: "I have been wandering through the courts, I have
listened to trials, I haveheard lawyers of eminence speak, I have heard judges
charge the jury." I then put the question: " Well, what practical benefit
have you derived from that?" The answer is, in nine cases out of ten, "ab-
solutely none." "Why?" "Because I knew nothing about the cases."
Now if those young men, before they had gone into the court room, had
gone into the Prothonotary's office in advance, and had found out what cases
were down in the trial list, and whether they were of moment or not; if
they had, in advance of the argument or trial, fitted themselves for an in-
telligent comprehension of the question that was to be tried or argued,
what would they have done? They certainly would have gone to the Ap-
pearance Docket, made a copy of the docket entries, ascertained the exact
nature of the case, observed how the prrcipe was drawn, how the writ was
framed, the place of service, what return was made, what steps were taken
subsequently by the plaintiff, how the defendant was forced to issue, how
the issue was framed, how the case reached the trial list, and how the jury
was selected. These things do not happen of themselves, it must be the re-
sult of intelligent and serious action. If, after having prepared yourselves
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by preliminary study of this sort for an intelligent comprehension of a trial,
you then go into court, you will find that it is not the brilliancy of the argu-
ment before the judge or jury that claims your first or last attention. Your
attention will. be riveted upon the substance and matter of the case. You
will have in your hands an exact copy of the plaintiff's statement of cause of
action. You will have the defendant's plea, and if any notice has been
given of'special matters that are to be offered in evidence, you will be fa-
miliar with what the defense relies upon. You will then take your seat at
the table, and you will notice very carefully exactly how the counsel for the
plaintiff opens. My own experience has been that the opening speech is the
most important one in nine cases out of ten. At the opening, when the
plaintiff's counsel has the first word, he makes the first impression on the
minds of the jurors, which up to that time are merely as pieces of blank
paper. If, in a concise and orderly manner, you find the leading counsel
making an opening so clear, so precise, so exact and so direct that there
cannot be any misapprehension on the part of the court or jury as to the
nature of the case, you will find that an impression has been made in his
favor. It is the story of a wrong, and if well told, sympathy will be en-
listed at the outset. One of England's greatest advocates, Sir James Scarlett,
never would entrust to the junior counsel the opening of the case, and he
always made a rule to understate rather than overstate, in order that when the
evidence came out the jury should be surprised at the strength of the evidence
and the overwhelming character of it. Whereas, if there was an exaggeration,
and the evidence fell short, the jury and the court both would believe that it
was the zeal of the advocate, and not the actual facts which had been presented
to them, and they could not fail to perceive that the evidence fell far short
of what they had been led to think. It is the most natural thing in the
world for a young man having a client's case in his hands to get up and
state it with all the high coloring and with all the warmth that he can give
to. it; but that is not the proper time to do it; before the evidence is in be
exceedingly careful that you do not state what you cannot prove, and re-
member that your proof in nine cases out of ten will fall below your expecta-
tions. Your client comes to you; he is excited, his blood is warm, and you
are also affected by his warmth and excitement, and he tells you that A, B,
and C will undoubtedly swear to the necessary facts; then you call A, B,
and C, and you find men somewhat languid, and indifferent to the issue, not
at all the zealous friends you had thought they would be, or men whose
temperaments are so calm that you cannot force them into anything very
emphatic; you must drag the truth from them; you must do this, too, by
questions that are not leading, or they will be objected to. So the most im-
portant lesson you can learn is to study a real master of practice, as to his
manner of opening a case, and if you had beforehand an exact knowledge of
the cause that he is to support based on your previous study of the record,
you then can observe how he addresses himself to the jury, and watch how
he puts his questions, how he shapes them.
I am quite free to admit that the active lawyer derives very little prac-
tical benefit from the reading of books on evidence; they do not tell him how
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to put the questions; you may read volume after volume, page after page, as
to what testimony is relevant and what is irrelevant, what witness is compe-
tent and what is not, what happens to be within the statute and what hap-
pens to be without, but you do not find anywhere any suggestions as to how
to put your questions to the witness. I do not know of any more exhausting
ordeal for an experienced counsel to undergo than to have a young man in
opposition to him. I have gone out of court more fatigued by having a young
man against me than if I had had an experienced practitioner, and for the
simple reason that a young man does not know how to put questions. He
violates the rules unconsciously at almost every stage of the case; conse-
quently the older man is confronted with the difficulty of either being com-
pelled to rise and object every few minutes, which is a positive disadvantage,
because the jury will think that he is trying to take advantage of the young
fellow, or if he does not object, he must permit questions to be put which
are a violation of the rules and which carry evidence absolutely incompetent
and improper which will affect the verdict. Now; how are you going to ac-
quire skill in putting questions, unless by watching the leaders as to the
manner in which they shape their questions? You must avoid involved
questions, you want something simple and straightforward, which call the
attention of the witness to the fact you wish to develop without suggesting
to him the answer; in other words you must not put yourselves on the wit-
ness stand by stating the facts in the question and requiring an answer of
" yes" or "no." You must not ask leading questions unless you wish your
questions to be continually objected to, and the objections sustained by the
court, and in a short time you will be in a sea of trouble tossing about in a
helpless and hopeless manner. Now, I do not know any better way of ac-
quiring knowledge on that point where you cannot attend an actual trial, than
to take up, after carefully selecting the right sort of a trial, the report of
the trial itself, and in doing that you will ignore absolutely the reports of the
decisions of the higher courts, the Supreme Court, the Court of Errors and
Appeals, with which you have been for three years so familiar. Those are
not the courts which are now of primary importance to you. You do not
find in the Supreme Court reports any statements as to how to put questions
or how to meet objections, and yet that is the practical knowledge that you
are in search of. You do not want to read an eloquent speech of a great ad-
vocate to the jury, published in misleading form, in a book where attention
is paid solely to the rhetorical passages, and no attention is paid to the evi-
dence, which constitutes the marrow of the case. You want a report which
is an exact photograph of the case itself from start to finish, which shows
exactly what was said just as reported by the stenographer. And if you
take a report of this kind and follow it from end to end you will learn more
from it in three hours reading than you would in ten hours spent in any other
way. The kind of trials I refer to are those which were published at or about
the time of some celebrated controversy. You will find them on book stalls
or in libraries, and however hard to secure, they are important. For instance
I have in my own library the original report of the trial of Eugene Aram,
whose story, you know, was made the basis of Bulwer's novel. This cele-
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brated scholar was tried, and convicted of murder, although the body of the
victim had been buried in a sand pit sixteen years before and where the cor-
fius delicli was discovered only by the accidental exposure of a bone. Now,
Bulwer has told the story in most attractive shape; he has made it the sub-
ject of a most exquisite literary romance, but so far as instruction and value
to the lawyer is concerned, it amounts to nothing; but when you bold in
your hand the exact account of that trial as printed three days after the ver-
dict was rendered, and you are able to follow not only the indictment, but
the opening of the Attorney General, the way in which he questioned the
witnesses for the Crown, the opening of the counsel for the defendant, the
way in which the rebuttal was conducted, and then the manner in which the
counsel summed up the case and the judge's charge to the jury, you then
possess, so to speak, an exact stenographic and phonographic report of the
case, and. you then can judge of the real value of a trial by jury.
Let me cite a case which took place in the House of Lords, the trial of a
Peer by his Peers, the trial of the Earl of Cardigan, who you remember was
the man who led the charge of the Light Brigade at the battle of Balaklava,
and who rode at the head of the "gallant six hundred" of whom Tennyson
has sung. The Earl was indicted for fighting a duel. He had challenged
one of his subordinate officers, Captain Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, to
meet him on Wimbledon Common. The captain having married a very at-
tractive young woman, the Earl became quite attentive to her, and this led
to the quarrel. The Earl being a member of the House of Lords, claimed
the privilege of being tried by his Peers, and for the first time in sixty years
since the trial of Lord Lovatt, the House of Lords. including Lords Broug-
ham, Lyndhurst, Denman, Wynford and others, met to try a noble Lord.
The question was whether the Earl had violated the statute which made duel-
ling a capital offense, provided of course there was intent to kill. The At-
torney General of England at that time was Sir John Campbell, authoy of the
lives of the Lord Chancellors, subsequently himself a Lord Chief Justice of
England, and still later a Lord Chancellor, and moreover he was the son-in-
law of Sir James Scarlett. The opening of the Attorney General indicated
absolute assurance that he was going to convict, and everything undoubtedly
showed that the Earl had sent the challenge. On a hill which overlooked
the common there stood a mill with a platform around the upper portion,
from which point of vantage the miller and his son had seen the carriages
containing the duelling parties approach. They saw the parties alight, saw
the seconds advance, then stoop over something which evidently was a box
containing pistols, take out the pistols, examine them, and then pace off
the distance; then they saw the principals themselves approach, and take
the exact positions designated by the seconds, wheel and fire; one fell. The
miller who was himself a constable, seized his long staff of office and im-
mediately approached the field and made arrests. He took the men up to
his house, and asked them separately for their cards. One card was handed
to him by the wounded man, which contained the name of Phipps Tuckett.
The Earl had no card, but said he was the Earl of Cardigan.
The Attorney General, confident that no answer could be made by the
ADDRESS OF HAMPTON L. CARSON
Earl to the facts of the case, after arguing on the meaning of the statute,
contented himself by putting in evidence the facts, which I have briefly de-
tailed, and then attempted to offer in evidence the card which Captain
Tuckett had handed to the miller. Instantly that most accomplished of Eng-
lish advocates, Sir William Follett, objected. His objection was based on
the fact that the card had been handed by Tuckett to the constable in the
absence of the Earl, and the Earl of course could not be bound by anything
which took place in his absence, particularly if anything was written on the
paper. Well, the objection was so unexpected that it irritated Campbell,
and he attempted to argue that it was preposterous for his friend to object
to that. He said that the Earl had been identified as the man on the ground,
that he had been arrested without any attempt to escape, that he had fired
in the direction of Tuckett, that Tuckett had fallen, was wounded, and then
a few minutes later handed a card to the constable, and there had been no
separation of the parties. The cause was presided over by Lord Denman.
The Chief justice waived the objection aside, saying that this was not the
exact stage at which the offer should be introduced. Campbell went on
and attempted to show exactly who Captain Tuckett was and what relations
he maintained to the Earl, and then suddenly closed his case, but just be-
fore closing he made a second offer of the card. Follett, believing that there
was some good reason why the Attorney General was so anxious to have
the card in evidence, said "will you kindly let me see that card, because
maybe I will not press the objection?" The card was handed to him; he
looked at it and, in an instant, said "I have no objection to the offer of this
in evidence." It was received with the words on it Phipps Tuckett. The
Attorney General then said "the Crown rests." Follett rose and impres-
siyely said "the defence has no evidence to offer, I move for the discharge
of the prisoner." "On what grounds?" asked the astonished Campbell.
"The indictment charges that the Earl of Cardigan drew a deadly weapon
and with intent to kill fired at one Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett; on this
card which was handed by the wounded man are the words Phipps Tuckett:
there is no proof that Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett and Phipps Tuckett
are the same man."
Now, gentlemen, imagine a situation before the Peers of England in
which the Attorney General then sixty-three years of age and an advocate of
great experience had absolutely failed to secure proof that the name on the
card belonged to the man who was identical with the individual whose name
was inserted in the indictment. A debate took place and all the great law-
yers agreed that it would have been a simple thing for the Attorney General
to have identified the two names as belonging to the same man, but he had
failed to do it. It would have been easy enough for a witness to have been
called who knew Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, and who could have iden-
tified him as the person at whom the Earl had fired. The identification
would then have been complete, but there was an absolute break-down in
the proof because of a failure to think out before-hand what exigencies
might arise. I give this as a sample to indicate a lesson which you cannot
get from a book on evidence.
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Take other cases: you have heard a great deal about the fame of Lord
Erskine-the peerless forensic leader of the English Bar; you have heard of
his many exploits in his defense of Tom Paine, of Horne Tooke, of Stock-
dale, who wrote in defense of Warren Hastings when he was charged with
mal-administration in India. Many were the successes of this incomparable
man, but what one of you has seen in any treatise, or what one has any ac-
tual knowledge of the real basis upon which the reputation of Lord Erskine
rests? It is not enough for you to pick up a volune of Select Speeches and
read his famous apostrophe to the Indian Chief. What you want to know
is how did he cross examine his witnesses, or whether he did cross examine
them, because, recollect cross examining is not what many men believe it to
be, putting questions in a very cross manner. It is exactly the reverse. The
most skillfull cross-examiners are those who handle the witness without the
witness ever knowing it. If one flies at the throat of a witness heiis instantly
up in opposition and ready to fight, and the sympathy of the jurors are with
the roughly treated witness. Now, how are you going to acquire that art;
how can you do it? You can not of course reproduce the voices of the
dead; they are gone-but what you want to do is to find out from some
source the exact way in which those cases were tried, exactly what those
men did, and if you do that, or, if in the absence of books at your comtAand,
you study cases in the way I have indicated, by going into the Courts and
watching the leaders, you will in time acquire knowledge and skill and judg-
ment.
Gentlemen, I wish to assure you that a case which has to be won by a
desperate speech at the end is rarely won. A case that has been successfully
and intelligently presented requires very little talk at the end. After the
judge has summed up the case and given it to the jury, almost invariably one
can predict the verdict beforehand; of course accidents happen, but I say
seriously, after a good many years of experience, that the harsh words hurled
upon the heads of jurors in my judgment are very much undeserved. If you
will take one hundred verdicts you will find that in ninety-five cases the ver-
dicts were right. Of course the counsel who loses the case cannot always
see it in that light. Always see what strength your opponent has on his
side of the case. Study his strength, and by looking at the case not only
from your side but also from your opponent's side, you will find that you will
acquire a practical knowledge, which no man can take away from you.
You want to supplement this of course by reading-careful reading.
Now you have accustomed yourselves to take up the reports of cases in the
Court of last Resort, and if you are familiar with the ordinary Case books,
as no doubt you are, you have simply the opinion of the Court, or perhaps a
selection made from the opinion of the Court by the compiler. My own
criticism upon case books is that they do not give the student all that he
ought to have. You have simply the result, you do not know how it was
reached; the pleadings and the arguments of counsel are eliminated, and you
are asked to assume a statement of facts, which is placed there as a mere
intellectual problem. You have worked out the difficult question arising
from the fact that A wrote a letter to B, A being in Boston and B being in
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the city of Philadelphia, and B having replied by letter posted at a certain
time, and because it was mailed the contract has been closed at the time of
the posting of the letter. But what were the facts in connection with the
matter, and what were the arguments of counsel in order to develop that re-
sult ? The case book does not tell you, and you do not get down to the
marrow of the controversy. What were the steps which led up to and were
employed in that judgment of the Court? Now you want to reverse this
process. You have been starting out by taking the final results of the last
judgment of the court of last resort, now reverse it, go the other way, instead
of starting with the result start at the beginning, go back, get the record in
the case, see how the lawyers opened the case; instead of going down stairs,
go up; follow the case step by step past this object on the bank and past
that object on the opposite bank, and you will find your acquaintance, with
the scenery becomes far more familiar, more real by seeing it in the reverse.
Then you can ascertain exactly the reason why the Court reached that con-
clusion. This is for nightwork.
I do Vot know how much attention is paid at the present day to Kent's
Commentaries, but I undertake to say that no young lawyer can spend his
time more profitably than by studying carefully the four last chapters in the
first volume of Kent. Here you will get suggestions which may be made a
useful introduction to still larger work. Study the Statutes. I do not know
how far instruction goes in statutes, but I know that while I was in the law
school very little attention was paid to statutes; almost all the attention was
given to reports. But you must read statutes. You pick up a digest, and
by going through it you will find alphabetically arranged an immense num-
ber of topics of which you never dreamed. You read and you find out that
the Legislature has passed a statute on some most important subject. Now,
you can put life into that; you can personify the statutej ust as you can personify
an" idea ; if you can be made to believe that the statute has a history, that it
has life, force and vitality, which makes it a real thing, a rule of action for
the government of the affairs of men, you can make your minds glow with a
certain interest in a statute, which will rob it of its repellent features, and
clothe it with real life. Take a statute which has become historic-
the Statute of Frauds, for instance. Now, haven't you asked yourselves
time and again why was it in the reign of Charles the Second that such a
statute as that against frauds was passed? What condition of affairs existed
in society which made it imperative that England in such an indifferent age
as that of Charles II should feel called upon to enact the Statute of Frauds ?
Have you got any real information with regard to the meaning or purpose of
that statute, unless you go behind it and ascertain the exact causes of its
birth? It must have a history; it did not spring spontaneously from the
brain of some lawyer without previous consideration. A statute must repre-
sent the demands of society, and not this statute alone. It is the same way
with any one of our great statutes-that of Wills, of Mortmain, of Evidence,
of Equity Jurisdiction. If you will turn your attention to the time before
the passing of the statute you will find there was an opportunity, just as be-
hind every leading case there stood an opportunity, and behind that oppor-
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tunity there stood a judge, and behind the judge there is a long line of cir-
cumstances, which, developed at the proper time and just at the proper place,
produced the decision.
Why was it that Lord Holts's decision in Coggs vs. Bernard, as affecting
the law of common carriers, and Lord Mansfield's decision in Carter vs.
Boehm in relation to insurance, came at the time they did ? Why was it
that Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Cohens vs. The State of Virginia,
or in Osborne vs. The Bank, or in Gibbons vs. Ogden, or in any of those
great judgments which have made his name immortal, came at the time they
did ? Because, just at the proper opportunity there came the occasion for
the delivery of the judgment, which represented certain developments of
society, which made it vital and inevitable that thejudgment should be pro-
nounced. If Chief Justice Marshall had dropped into his grave at the end
of fifteen years of judicial service he would have passed down to posterity,
having given but a single judgment of any weight, that of Marbury vs. Mad-
ison; but, as the country grew, nearly all of his great judgments were pro-
nounced later. Now, when you think that an anatomist can reconstruct an
entire animal from mere fragments of bone, so can you, if you have any real
conception 9 f the events which led to the delivery of a great judgment in a
great cause, reconstruct the conditions of society. Do not treat a law case
as an abstract thing, as though it were a mathematical problem. Do not at-
tempt to make a dead analytical study of it, but learn that the great body of
the Common Law, which has life and growth, and which will continue to
grow from age to age, has gathered up the results of the *wisdom
of ages. You must believe that there is a spirit which runs through all the
centuries, and which makes those judgments veritable monuments of wisdom
for the practical government of men.
How are you going to ascertain the measure of value you can place on
the judgment of a Court? You say there are a multitude of judgments, and
you do not know the important from the unimportant ones. What book
will give you information on the subject? Take Foss' Judicial Dictionary;
there, in a single volume, you will find brief biographies of every judge who
has sat on the bench in England. After awhile the useful feature of the
book will present itself to your minds, and you will be able to estimate the
value of the opinions of different judges. You all know the value of an
opinion by Mansfield, but are you acquainted with the value of the opinions
of less important judges, and are you to attach the same weight to their names
that you would to the greatest of common law judges, whose opinions are so
familiar to us? Just so with American judges. It is not enough for a man,
by diligence among law registers, law magazines and digests, of which there
are so many, simply to pick out a common pleas decision, or some decision
of the Supreme Court of a Western or Eastern or Northern or Southern
State. What you want to know is, what value are you to attach to that de-
cision ; is he a great judge, is he a learned judge, is he a wise judge, is he
a new judge, is he an inexperienced judge ? That is what you want to
know. Well, you must read the lives of the judges, and you will find that
it takes a long time to make a judge, and that as a judge grows older the
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man becomes a wiser, better judge, provided, of course, that he retains his
faculties.
Then, too, you must pursue your reading. You want to keep up your
text book reading, but you do not want to overwhelm yourselves with text
book work. If you have a specific point to sustain before the Court, re-
member you will always find disappointment in the ordinary text book.
You want to be able to fall back upon fundamental principles; you want to
be able to reason on general principles as to what the law is, and hence to
what the law should be. Books like Williams on Real Property, Haynes'
Outlines of Equity, The Introduction to Adams' Equity, Stephen on Plead-
ing; Smith on Contracts, Anson onl Contracts, and Chitty on Pleading,-
books of that stamp-are immortal. You cannot make yourselves too
familiar with them, and I would go back with all zeal and ardor to Black-
stone, because that wonderful book you will find more and more worthy of
your consideration and attention everytime you read it. Then read Maine
on Ancient Law.
Well, now, gentlemen, when you find that you are jaded with this ever
accumulating load of labor, you want to feel that your struggles were
paralleled by the experience of other men. You want some voice to pene-
trate the silence of your chamber with cheering notes, and you turn to the
life of some great lawyer, a giant in the profession, and you find his ex-
perience was precisely similar to yours. Do not place any confidence in
those misleading biographies which always describe a man as getting in a
very short time into a lucrative practice and astonishing courts and juries
by the extent and range of his information. They are all written after the
man has become famous, and you are not told what his experiences really
were. Thomas Jefferson, according to one biographer, in the first three
years of his practice made as much at the Bar as a man of ten years in
active practice at the present time makes in one of the large cities. It is a
fable. Usually such statements are entirely groundless, based on no evi-
dence at all. Read Mr. Binney's Eulogium of Chief Justice Tilghman, in
the appendix to the 16th volume of Sergeant and Rawle. There you have
a perfect portrait of a great judge, and can learn what Chief Justice Tilgh-
man did for the jurisprudence of this State. You also have a statement of'
the difficulties which he encountered in his long struggle for professional
success, and you also learn the exact nature and character of those things
which contributed to his success. Read Kennedy's Life of William Wirt,
Story's Life and Letters, and the Life of Benjamin Robbins Curtis. Read
Townsend's Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, or Roscoe's Eminent Law-
yers. Then go further back and dwell in the cloistered ages, far back in the
days of the Knighis Templar. You walk down the Strand in London,
her busiest street, and there where Temple Bar spanned the narrow highway
you look at the very spot where the heads of criminals were exposed on
pikes. You turn through the gate on the right and in an instant the roar
and bustle of great London ceases, and you enter that calm and impressive
sanctuary which for more than six centuries has been dedicated to the profes-
sion of the law. You look at the lamb and the horse, displayed there as em-
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blems of the Temple-two riders on a horse, the indication of the poverty of
the order, and the lamb with the holy banner, the indication of the purity
of its principles. Can there be to anyone, even though not a student of law,
a better field for contemplation? Yes, even from a literary or historic stand-
point. Here is the grave of Goldsmith, and there on the walls and over the
arches are the images of the great judges who for six or seven centuries have
made the English law what it is. The lexicographer Johnson wrote his
dictionary there. There are the very chambers occupied by Blackstone, here
is where Dickens trod the scene with Little Nell, here is where the very spar-
rows hopped over the lawn, for whom Lamb wrote his plea for their preserva-
tion. There is the very garden in which were plucked the roses, red -and
white, emblems of Lancaster and York in the War of the Roses. Many are
the marks of this great profession in those halls where generation after gen-
eration of lawyers have hurried into shadow in garment and cowl, in wig
and robe.
Young men, you must realize that it is justice and the administration
of justice, that has made the law the guardian of our liberty. Inspired by
these traditions, appreciate the value of your opportunities, and cling with a
whole souled devotion to that which is pure, to that which is good, to that
which is lofty, to that which is true, and may the blessings of God rest on
you and reward you for your labors.
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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES.
THE CHARACTER OF TH4 WITNESS.
Men differ in respect to the proportion of the cases in which their state-
nients correspond with the facts. This correspondence will depend on the
powers of observation, the strength of memory, the disposition to be truth-
ful, of the various declarants. The so-called character of the witness is
therefore a means of determining the weight to attach to his assertions.
PRESUMED GOOD.
Every witness is presumed, without proof, to have the ordinary credi-
bility. There may be something in his demeanor, his social station, his
profession, that warrants the belief that he has more than the ordinary
trustworthiness, and the court or jury, learning these circumstances, will be-
stow such credence as they think they warrant. The party calling a wit-
ness cannot directly prove the character of the witness to be superior to, or
even equal to the average; he cannot furnish evidence that it is good until
it has been attacked. "Every witness," says Woodward, J., "puts his
character in issue, but until evidence tending directly to impeach it is pro-
duced, the law presumes it to be good, and therefore testimony to prove it
good is superfluous,"' and it would be error for the court to submit to the
jury the general character of the witness without evidence touching that
character. 2
WHAT CHARACTER.
The general veracity of the witness, his general honesty, obedience to
law, etc., is not the subject of proof, but only the reputation which his
character has engendered among his contemporaries. In Wike v. Light-
ner, 3 Tilghman, C. J., pronounced a question "What is the general charac-
ter of York Frever," (not inquiring for his reputation for veracity), to be
"strictly proper," and an elaborate judgment in Commonwealth v. Mc-
Clai, 4 affirms that the appropriate question is not concerning the veracity
but the general character of the witness. It has since been assumed, how-
ever, that the question should inquire for the reputation for truth and
veracity. In Commonwealth v. Payne5 the trial court refused to allow the
'Wertz v. May, 21 Pa. 274.
2Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54, 61, 72.
11 S. & R. 198.
44 Cl. 462.
1105 Pa. 101.
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question what is the general reputation of the witness, although the answer
to it was to be followed by the question what is his reputation for truth and
veracity. "The offer," says Mitchell, J., "was properly excluded. The
only point relevant to the case was the truthfulness of the witness' testi-
mony. This might be attacked by direct contradiction, or by showing a
special animus or prejudice on the part of the witness against the prisoner,
or by showing a bad reputation for truth and veracity in general. But this
is the extent," and he characterizes the allowance of inquiries into the
general character a "vicious practice." For over half a century what is
here designated the proper practice seems to have been the prevalent one in
Pennsylvania.' The reputation of a female witness for unchastity cannot
be proven, in order to impeach her credibility.2 "Granting," says Gibson,
C. J., "that universal immorality includes want of veracity, yet a man may
be intemperate, incontinent, profane and addicted to many other vices that
ruin the reputation, and yet retain a scrupulous regard for truth. * * It
is, after all, character for veracity alone, with which the jury have to do
* * * * it follows that * * * an inquiry into anything else is ille-
gitimate." In an earlier ease, the same judge, not denying that habitual
drunkenness might be shown to impeach the credibleness of a female wit-
ness, held that this drunkenness could not itself be established by a reputa-
tion of being habitually drunk. 3
HOW THEB REPUTATION IS PROVZD.
As the good reputation of a witness is always presumed, the party who
denies it initiates the investigation, by giving evidence of the bad character
(or reputation) of the witness for truth (and veracity). A party's admission
of the bad reputation of a witness, would, doubtless, dispense with proof of
it by the opposite party4 , but the knowledge by the jury of the subjective
character of the witness, or of his objective reputation, as respects veracity,
cannot dispense with proof. Hence, there being no evidence submitted con-
cerning the character of witnesses, it would be error for the court to tell the
jury that they "must consider the witnesses, who they are, what their charac-
ter is in the community, whether their character for veracity has been as -
sailed," since to do so would give to the jury "the power of testing evidence
by that which could be found only outside of the trial itself, perhaps in the
personal knowledge of some of the jurors." 5
THEI NUMBE4R OF WITNESSES WHO ATTACK REPUTATION.
The reputation for veracity of X may be known to one or many, and
'Cook v. Miller, 6 W. 507; Brewster v. Yourd, 3 W. 99; Morss v. Palmer, 15
Pa. 51; Chess v. Chess, I Pa. 32; Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 W. 380; Moyer v. Moyer,
49 Pa. 210; Commonwealth v. Duckworth, 2 Pa. C. C. 443; Herstine v. Lehigh V.
R. R., 151 Pa. 244; Bishop v. Lehman,.9 Phila. 112; Oberholtzer v. Heist, 16
Atlan. 804; Zell v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. 258; Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R.
336; Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa. 203.
2Gilchriqt v. McKee, 4 W. 380.
3Brindle v. McIlvaine, 10 S. & R. 282. The justice concedes that intemperance
"may not only impair the memory but weaken the perception of truth in the moral
faculties of the mind," an infelicitous phrase to express an incontestable fact.
4Quinn v. Crowell, 4 Wh. 334.
5Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54.
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there is prescribed no minimum number of the assailing witnesses. There
might be one, two,' several, 2 twenty-eight,' many. 4 One witness quite
familiar with a community might be able to satisfy a jury with respect to the
opinions of its components concerning the veracity of one its members.
QUALIFICATION OF IMPEACHING WITNESS.
The impeaching witness must before testifying respecting the character
of the primary witness, satisfy the court "that he has adequate means of
knowledge of the character" of the latter.' Prior to an inquiry concerning
reputation it is necessary to lay grounds by asking whether the witness is
acquainted with the witness intended to be impeached and with his general
reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he resides. Q
It is not necessary that the secondary witness should personally know the
primary witness. He is not to express his own judgment of the trustworthi-
ness of the latter, as a result of his acquaintance with the latter. Witness B
cannot, e. g., say that witness A "worked for me three days, and from his
conduct during that time, I had reason to believe him not to be an honest
man.'" "A witness called on to impeach the credit of another, is never
permitted to speak of his knowledge of particular facts from which he draws
an opinion of the witness examined." When A says that he has no
knowledge of B's general character but by report, he shows that he is "ex-
actly qualified to be heard," since common report is character, and to
know the report is to know the character.9 The witness must show that he
lives or has lived in the neighborhood in which the witness to be attacked
lives or has lived, or that he is in such contact with this neighborhood that
he would be able to learn the opinions entertained by its members concerning
the witness.
TH PLACE OF THE REPUTATION.
A man has generally no reputation with regard to veracity, except in
the locality in which he has resided or done frequent business. It is usual
therefore to inquire into his character for veracity in the locality where he
resides, 10 or, if he does business in a place other than that of his residence, in
that place."I A man's reputation may pervade his county, and it is not im-
proper to ask the impeaching witness what his general reputation for truth
is in the county' 2 or larger area, possibly, which his reputation permeates. "
In Wike v. Lightner, the question indicated no topographical boundaries.
'Bishop v. Lehman, 9 Phila. 112.
2Cook v. Miller, 6 W. 507.
3Hepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592.
.4Herstine v. Lehigh V. R. R., 151 Pa. 244.
5 Commonwealth v. Duckworth, 2 Pa. C. C. 443.
6 Thompson. J.; Bogle v. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. 465.7 Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198.
8Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336. The witness' opinion of the credibility of
the impeached witness is irrelevant. He must report the reputation of this witness.
Oberholtzer v. Heist, 16 Atlan. 804.
9 Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336.
10 Bogle v. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. 465; Brewster v. Yourd, 3 W. 99; Chess v. Chess, 1 P.
& W. 32.
"Hepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592.
' 2Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336.
13 Chess v. Chess, 1 P. & W. 32.
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It was "What is the general character of York Frever, negro, or do you
know him?" but the witness apparently lived in the neighborhood in which
Frever had lived, and the reputation of the latter there was what he would
testify to.' "The witness," says Smith, J., "is not strictly confined to the
immediate neighborhood of the person (where reputation is to be investi-
gated), but is allowed to say what his character for truth is in the county, or
what the people in general say as to his general character." 
2
THE TIME OF THE REPUTATION.
The object to be subserved by inquiry into the character for veracity of
the witness, is to ascertain the probable credibility of the testimony which
he has delivered. His tendency, at the time of testifying, to speak truly, is
the theme of quest. A reputation for veracity or inveracity, a long time be-
fore, would reveal the tendency to truth or falsehood at or before the time
of the reputation. But men's habits with respect to telling the truth, may
change, and with them, their reputations. The reputation proven must be
so near in time, to the trial, as to warrant the belief that there has been no
change in it or in the habit of which it is the consequence. A reputation
current four years before the trial is too remote to be a reliable source of in-
ference as to present credibility.
3 The controversy which has resulted in
the trial, may have arisen a considerable time before the trial, and may
have contributed to the bad reputation of a witness. This is no sufficient
reason for excluding evidence of reputation current since the origin of the
controversy. And no difference seems to be made between impeaching and
supporting evidence. The impeaching and the supporting evidence may
alike be of a reputation since the rise of the controversy, more than two years
before the trial. 4 If it appears that the witness had any connection with
the controversy, and that that connection had become the subject of conver-
sation or discussion in the neighborhood, and that the reputation testified to
by the impeaching or supporting witness, was founded on the expression of
partisan opinions by those who had taken sides in the dispute, the jury may
consider this fact in determining the weight to be given to the testimony. It
would not be a ground for exclusion of the evidence. 5
THE OPINION OP'THE IMPEACHING WITNESS.
The opinion of the impeaching witness, founded on his knowledge of
the impeached witness, that the latter is unworthy of credit, is irrelevant.
6
It might be groundless, er it might be founded on his knowledge of particu-
lar facts. In either case it would be inadmissible.
7 But, after he has testi-
fied that the character, i. e., the reputation, for veracity is bad, he may
state whether, in consequence of the badness of it, he would believe the im-
peached witness on oath. The unwillingness to believe must be founded on
iWike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198.
2Chess v. Chess, 1 P. & W. 32.
3Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 572.
4Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa. 203.
DId. In Epler v. Metzger, 17 Super. 56, the testimony was seemingly, con-
cerning the reputation prior to the bringing of the suit on a promissory note.60Oberholtzer v. Heist, 16 Atlan. 804.
7 Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198.
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the impeaching witness' knowledge of the reputation.1 If the witness has
said that the character of the primary "witness is not good," says Thomp-
son, J., "then the question may be put 'from your knowledge of his general
reputation for truth, would you believe him under oath?' "2 If the question
asks for the impeaching witness' readiness to believe or disbelieve the im-
peached witness under oath, without saying "from your knowledge of his
general reputation" would you believe him, the question is inadmissible.
The ground of the unwillingness to believe must be mentioned in the
question. 3
TH4 VOLUME OF THE REPUTATION.
The witness should testify to the reputation of the primary witness.
This he is to induct from the expressions of suspicions or opinions of others
as to the conduct or intrinsic character of the impeached witness. He is
not simply to state that such witness has a bad reputation, because others
have told him that he has such reputation. To suffer this would be to al-
low the reputation to be proved, not by one who kn6ws it, but by one who
has heard another who professes to know it, state what it is. 4 The sus-
picions or opinions of how many people must the witness have heard ex-
pressed? In a large community, and in the case of an eminent or notori-
ous person, the number, both absolute and relative, of those who would
have suspicions or opinions would be greater than in a small community, or
in the case of an inconspicuous man. It has not been decided that a wit-
ness must be able to say that he has heard one-half or one-third, or one-
quarter or other fraction of the adult population, or of such portion of it as
has a suspicion or belief, express a suspicion or belief concerning the im-
peached witness. Gibson, J., in Kimmel v. Kimmel,
5 affirms that "the wit-
ness is to give not his own judgment in the matter, but the aggregate result
of at least a inajorily of the voices he has heard; or, in other words, (for after
all there is, perhaps, no more plain or practical exposition of the matter), he
must state what the common report is among those who have the best op-
portunity of judging of the habits and integrity of the person whose charac-
ter is under consideration," but a majority of the voices the witness has
heard may be an insignificant minority of all the voices that have spoken.
Nevertheless, the question "Have you heard of others whether he (the im-
peached witness) was a dishonest man, or bore a bad character?" the answer
to which was "I heard others say that he was a bad fellow," was condemned
lWike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198; Bogle v. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. 465; Common-
wealth v. Payne, 205 Pa. 102; Epler v. Metzger, 17 Super. 56; O'Bryan v.
Bowers, 10 Pa. C. C. 2.54; Bishop v. Lehman, 9 Phila. 112; Hepworth v. Hen-
shall, 153 Pa. 592; Commonwealth v. McClain, 4 Cl. 462; Cf. Lyman v. Philader-
phia, 56 Pa. 488.
2Bogle v. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. 465.
3id. The witness said of Graham, the primary witness, "his character for
truth and veracity was never good; his character was bad." The next question
"whether he would believe him on oath," was properly excluded. In Chess v.
Chess, 1 P. & W. 32, Smith, J., said that he had heard the question, similar in form
to this, put for 30 years and more, without objection.
4Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336.
13 S. & R. 336.
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by Tilghman, C. J.' "I think this was too narrow. It might be very true
that the witness had heard others speak ill of Frever, and yet that might not
have been his general character. Two or three are others. There are few
men of whom some do not speak well and some evil. But the question is
(that is, should be) what is said by people in general." 2 The surest way to
get the judgment of a majority of one's neighbors would be to name them
severally and to obtain the opinion of each concerning the impeached wit-
ness. It could then be ascertained whether those whose opinion was proven
were a majority or not. This, however, is precisely what is not allowed.
"Except in answer to a question on cross-examination, a witness to charac-
ter is not permitted to give the report he has heard from particular individu-
als. '" 3 He is obliged to induct and generalize without stating particulars.
He must say that the preponderant opinion about the assailed witness, is so
and so. Whether his generalization is justified by the number of persons
whom he has heard speak on the subject, relatively to the whole number
that have spoken,-and we may feel sure that in an immense majority of
cases it is not justified,-can be learned only by the cross-examination of the
party proposing the assailed witness, demanding the names of the persons
whom he has heard speak on the subject. If a witness has the temerity to
say that he knows the prevalent opinion, the opinion of "people in general,"
he ipso facto qualifies himself to testify. If, more modest and more accurate,
and conscious that he has not counted voices, lie declines to make a rash
generalization, but confines himself to saying that he has heard "others" say,
or "several" say, or a "good many" say so and so, he imperils the compe-
tency of what he affirms that he has thus heard, to be received at all.
ATTACKING BY CHARACTER OF CONTRADICTED WITNESS.
The untruth of one witness may be inferred, perhaps, from the fact that
he is contradicted in material points by another witness, whom the jury be-
lieves; but the fact that the first witness, who is thus contradicted, is sup-
ported by evidence that his reputation for veracity is good will not authorize
the jury to infer that the reputa.ion of the contradicting witness is bad, if
they are in doubt as to his testimony. The good reputation of A, who has
testified in one way, does not prove the bad reputation of B, who has dis-
tictly contradicted him, and by so doing virtually imputed to him being a
forger and a liar.
4
DEFENDING THE WITNESS' CHARACTER.
It has been already remarked that the good character of witnesses can-
not be proven until evidence that it is bad has appeared. Although show-
ing that ie has made statements, whether under oath or not, which are in-
consistent with those made in the trial, lessens his credibility, this does not
'Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198. In Brewster v. Yourd, 3 W. 99, the witnesses
were asked "as to the current of opinion amongst a majority of his (the impeached
witness') neighbors," as to his credibility.2
"Character can be impeached only by evidence of general reputation. *
It should be what People in general say and not what others say." Snyder v.
Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 519.
3
Brewster v. Yonrd, 3 W. 99.
4Commonwealth v. Hazlett, 14 Super. 352.
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warrant proof of his good reputation. "Evidence in support of the general
character of witnesses, is not competent," says Woodward, J., "until their
general character has been assailed."' The impeachment of the testi-
mony by facts and circumstances developed during the trial, does not justify
resort to evidence of good character for veracity. Such defects in the testi-
mony may be accounted for by mistake or lack of memory, and whatever
of it remains uncontradicted may be accepted without hesitation. 2 The
contradiction of the witness by other witnesses, does not warrant proof of
his good character for veracity. A witness, e. g., having sworn that certain
money was paid to X, and the opposite party having proven by witnesses
that the money was not paid; that is, that the testimony of the witness was
untrue, it is not permissible to prove that his general reputation for veracity
is good. 3 Certain exceptions to the principle that evidence of good reputa-
tion must be preceded by evidence of bad reputation are mentioned by
Rogers, J., e. g., where on cross-examination, the witness admits or it is
otherwise proved that he has committed an offence which affects his charac-
ter, in which case it can be shown that his general character since the con-
viction has been good; where a subscribing witness to a will being dead, it
is alleged that he prepared the will, and caused a second attesting witness to
subscribfe to it after the death of the testator, in which case those who were
interested could prove his good character.
WEAKENING IMPEACHING TESTIMONY.
The testimony of the impeaching witness may be weakened by his cross-
examination. He may be required to name the persons from whom he has
heard expressions of adverse opinion, and may be unable to name any, or
any considerable number. 4 Some latitude must be allowed to the cross-ex-
amination of impeaching witnesses, excluding however such details as would
create collateral issues. They may, e. g., be questioned as to their business
and social relations with the impeached witness. 5 Those named may be
called afterwards, and may deny that they have expressed the adverse opin-
ion attributed to them by the attacking witness. They may also say that
they would believe the impeached witness under oath. 6 If they are not
present at the trial, a rule for a new trial may be made absolute if, being
eight in number, six of them depose that they have not made the statements
attributed to them. 7 Other witnesses may be called to contradict the im-
peaching witness, by saying that the general character for veracity of the
assailed witness is good. 8
.'Wertz v. May, 21 Pa. 274; Myre v. Ludwig, 1 Pa. 47.2
Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54.
3Braddee v. Brownfield, 9 W. 124.
4Brewster v. Yourd, 3 W.'99; Hepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592.
GHepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592. The attacking witness may in chief say
that he has had contests at law with the impeached witness, and may be prejudiced
against him, and that he probably ought not to be called to testify as to the charac-
ter of the latter. This would not be a good reason for rejecting his evidence. The
jury should hear it, and judge of its credibleness. Cook v. Miller, 6 W. 507.
6Hepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592, O'Bryan v. Bowers, 10 Pa. C. C. 254.7 0'Bryan v. Bowers, 10 Pa. C. C. 254.
8Brewster v. Yourd, 3 W. 99; Chess v. Chess, 1 P. & W. 32; Herstine v. Lehigh
V. R. R., 151 Pa. 244; Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. 488.
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TIME OF THE GOOD REPUTATION.
As the relevant question is, what is the present credibility of the witness,
the testimony must be as to the comparatively recent good reputation. The
reputation between the inception of the controversy and the impeached wit-
ness' delivery of his testimony, is not to be excluded, although it may have
been damaged by his participation in the transaction which is the topic of
investigation. ' Perhaps a larger latitude is conceded, with regard to the age
of the good reputation, than of the bad reputation of the witness.
2  Evi-
deuce of the bad reputation of the witness in his present neighborhood,
where he has resided for ten years, being given, the good reputation he used
to enjoy prior to these years in the neighborhood of his former residence, may
be proven. "It is not necessary," says Rogers, J., "that the good reputa-
tion should be of the same period as the impeaching."' But, how is it rele-
vant to know what a man's reputation for veracity was 15 years before the
delivery of his testimony? Perhaps there is a presumption that the veracity
of which this reputation is a witness, would persist to the time of the trial,
a presumption which seems to be repudiated in Miller v. Miller, 4 where evi-
dence of bad reputation four years before the trial was excluded. Is there
any less probability that a man, who four years ago was unveracious, has be-
come credible, than that a man, who four years ago was veracious, has be-
come incredible? Or is it easier to continue good than to continue bad?
PLACE OF THE GOOD REPUTATION.
The witness may have a good reputation beyond the locality in which
he resides, for he may have frequent intercourse, the source of reputation,
with people in other places. Persons being in Pittsburg, e. g., may support
the credibility of a person living four miles from it in the same,5 or another,
county; or A, living 17 miles from B, may know and support B's reputa-
tion. 6 A man's neighborhood is co-extensive with his intercourse among
his fellow-citizens. It is not necessary that the witness should know the
reputation of the impeached witness in his immediate neighborhood. The
fact that the reputation does not come from the person's immediate neigh-
borhood may lessen its weight but not its competency. "It is sometimes
easy to excite a prejudice against one in the town, village or neighborhood.
where he resided. To confine him in vindication to the same place where
the atmosphere has been polluted by sinister arts, no man's character, would
be safe."
' 7
CONTENTS OF THE TESTIMONY.
Not to have a bad reputation is to have a good reputation. The mere
silence of the community concerning a man is good evidence that it knows
no ill of him, for it delights in nothing so much as in vilifying its members,
'Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa. 203.
2Chess v. Chess, 1 P. & W. 32; Morss v. Palmer, 15 Pa. 51.
3Morss v. Palmer, 15 Pa. 51.
4187 Pa. 572.
5 Chess v. Chess, 1 P. & W. 32.
6 Morss v. Palmer, 15 Pa. 51.
71d.
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if it can do so without too clear a sense that it is untruthfully doing so. The
testimony of a witness that he had never heard the character of another men-
tioned in his neighborhood, would be receivable as vindicatory of him.
"But surely," remarks Rogers, J., "it is evidence in support of character,
that a witness acquainted with the person assailed, living in his neighbor-
hood, has never heard any ill of him. It is certainly some proof that a
person against whom the tongue of slander has never been heard to wag, is
not so destitute of truth and sincerity as that he ought not to be believed on
his oath." 1
WILLINGNESS TO BELIEVE WITNESS UNDER OATH.
After testifying to the good reputation of witness X for veracity, A
may be asked, whether, in consequence of this reputation, he would believe
X under oath and his affirmative answer will be admissible, 2 but until he
states his knowledge of X's general good reputation, "he has no legitimate
foundation for his belief" (i. e., his readiness to believe). A supporting
witness saying that he had never heard X's reputation questioned before
this case, except by persons connected with him in business, on cross-
examination added "I never heard it said he had a good reputation. I
never heard his reputation spoken of. I have heard people say he has lied."
It was not proper then to permit him to answer the question "if -he would
believe X upon oath, judging from the knowledge he has of his general
reputation for truth," because his cross-examination showed "that he did
not possess the knowledge of X's general reputation for truth, requisite as a
ground to enable him to give his own belief in X's oath." 3 The vindi-
cating witness' willingness to believe X should not be the result of his
knowledge of the personal traits and conduct of X, but of his knowledge of
his reputation. 4
EFFECT OF THE IMPEACHMENT.
It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the effect of the im-
peachment of the witnesses. If in a damage case, the character of the
principal witness for the plaintiff, who is himself, is attacked, the omission
to give this instruction will not be rendered venial by the failure of the de-
fendant to request the instruction. 5 The court properly directs the jury to
consider the assailing witnesses, asking them "Are they people who know
him (the impeached witness) well, who know the community in which he
lives, and who are able probably to judge as to what his general reputation
in the neighborhood is ?"
The number and dignity of the attacking witnesses may be so great,
their knowledge of the reputation so good, their testimony so clear and posi-
tive, that the jury cannot but believe that the impeached witness has a very
bad reputation for veracity. They may then be told by the court that they
1Morss v. Palmer, 15 Pa. 51.2 Hepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592; Chess v. Chess, I P. & W. 32; Common-
wealth v. McClain, 4 Cl. 462.
3
Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. 488.4 Hepworth v. Henshall, 153 Pa. 592.
GHerstine v. Lehigh V. R. R., 151 Pa. 244.
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should not believe his testimony unless it is found by them to be fully cor-
roborated.1  If his reputation be bad, says Gordon, J., "corroboration must
follow the evidence in all material parts. or it is worthless," a much severer
result than if the witness had been impeached merely by the contradictions
of other witnesses, or by his having on former occasions made statements
which his present testimony contradicts. 2 A justice of the peace testifying
to the falsity of his own certificate, and his character for veracity being im-
peached, it was, held that the effect was to destroy his testimony, and to let
the certificate stand. 3 But, even when the plaintiff is the sole witness for
himself, the court may tell the jury not to reject his testimony as worthless,
unless convinced that his reputation is so bad that they could not safely rest
their verdict upon it. The credibility of the impeaching witnesses, and the
inconsistency of their testimony if believed with the credibility of the im-
peached withess, the jury must ascertain.
4
FACULTY FOR DEFENDING REPUTATION OF WITNESS.
The party who calls a witness is manifestly interested in maintaining
his credit before the jury, but the witness himself has an interest, often
deeper than that of the party. The court regards this interest, no less than
that of the party, in furnishing facilities for the defense of the reputation of
the witness. 5 "It is the duty of the court," says Rogers, J., "to protect
them by affording them some latitude to defend themselves from the slanders
which are often heaped upon them." 6 If without any intimation that his
reputation is going to be attacked, the witness leaves the place of trial, and
then impeaching witnesses are called, the court may properly award a new
trial.
7
SUBSTITUTF4 FOR REPUTATION FOR VERACITY.
The support of the witness must not be, by a reputation for anything
else than veracity. The election of a man to the office of constable does not
necessarily express the judgment of the electors, that he is veracious. If it
did, this expression of their judgment is not under oath. The number of
those who voted for him relatively to the whole number of electors, or even
to the whole number voting on the occasion, might be less than a majority.
It has been held, in Brewster v. Yourd, 8 that an impeached witness cannot
be vindicated by proof that he had been several times elected constable in
his township. "General character," says Gibson, C. J., "results from the
'Commonwealth v. Burton, 1 Susq. L. Chron. 66.2Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54.
3 Beam v. Haminton, 10 L. Bar. 69.
4Oberholtzer v. Heist, 16 Atlan. 804.
5
Bishop v. Lehman, 9 Phila. 112; Morss v. Palmer, 15 Pa. 51; Howser v. Com-
monwealth, 51 Pa. 332; the right to object that the answer to a question would in-
criminate the witness, is his, and not the party's. E41iott v. Boyle, 31 Pa. 65.
6McKim v. Somers, 1 P. & W. 297. Hence, if on cross-examination a witness
is asked why he omitted to state to X, (to whom he was giving a history of an oc-
currence), a certain fact to which he has just testified, and he says in reply that he
did so, because he feared L (the plaintiff in the suit) who was his landlord, and who
was a quarrelsome man, he may call a witness to prove that L was in fact quarrel-
some and that he was his tenant.
7Bishop v. Lehman, 9 Phila. 112.
83 W. 99.
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voice of the neighborhood, not of electors happening to be present 'at an
election, who are but a small part of the inhabitants of either sex whose
opinions enter into the general estimate of individual conduct and behavior.
* * * He (the supporting witness) must speak to the tone of the neigh-
borhood, which is certainly not indicated by the event of an election; else a
failure to be chosen would fasten on the unsuccessful candidate an imputa-
tion of moral dereliction, which would be competent to discredit him in a
court of justice-a consequence which will not seriously be attributed to it."
IMPEACHING BY SPECIFIC ACTS. PERJURY.
The reputation of a man for veracity or falseness, if well founded, must
grow out of the observation by somebody, of his actual truth or falseness in
specific cases. As these specific cases justified the inference made by the
observer that he was truthful or not, so the proof of the cases to the jury
would justify an inference -by it of the same sort. There is no objection,
e. g., if it appeared that the witness had committed perjury on a certain oc-
casion, to allow the jury to consider that fact, in estimating his present
credibility. The act of 1887, which has abolished incompetency founded on
conviction of crime, has preserved the incompetency founded on conviction
of perjury or of subornation of perjury. It is not the conviction but the
perjury itself, that produces the .unworthiness of credit, and the act of 1887
is a testimony to the relation between the past commission of perjury and
the present credibleness of the witness. A conviction of perjury, even if,
on account of a pardon, it will not exclude the witness, may probably be
proven for the purpose of impairing credibility; and, if proven, may more
or less impair that credibility. The degree must be determined by the jury. I
A witness, cross-examined or otherwise, may admit that he has on a former
occasion perjured himself, and the fact may doubtless be considered by the
jury.
2
MODE OF PROVING THE PERJURY.
The perjury may be admitted by the witness, during his examination in
chief, or in answer to a question on cross-examination. He is, however, not
bound to answerthe question if he or the party who calls him objects. Various
reasons for this are assigned by Lowrie, J.; that the answer might disgrace
or expose him to a criminal prosecution; that, if his reputation for veracity
remains good among his neighbors he should not be discredited for particu-
lar acts by the jury, and the impeaching evidence should be the bad reputa-
tion of the witness, not specific acts.3 If the witness answers and admits his
having committed the perjury, it may be considered by th4 jury. The sug-
gestion of Lowrie, J., that a "court and jury can have no grounds for dis-
'Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316.
2 Commonwealth v. Greason, 204 Pa. 64; Elliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65.
BFlliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65. In Cole v. High, 173 Pa. 590, an action for fraud
by a vendee -on the vendor, in induping a sale, the plaintiff, as witness, was asked
whether in a previous criminal prosecution for the same fraud, he did not swear to
statements which were false. The Supreme Court justified the exclusion of the
question, because it did not specify the part of the affidavit and ask whether that
part was true or false. Had it been specific, the question would have been proper,
says Green, J.
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crediting him, except such as may arise from his want of intelligence or
candor, from his contradictions or partisanship in testifying before them,"
woulck hardly be heeded. If the witness denies that he has committed the
act of perjury, the courts would probably say that whether he did or not
was collateral, and that he could not be shown to have committed it, by
other witnesses. 1 In Hester v. Commonwealth 2 the offer to prove by C
that K, who had testified for the Commonwealth, and was an accomplice in
the murder, had tried to induce C to perjure himself for K, should K be ar-
rested, declaring that be, K, "would swear to a lie at any time to benefit a
friend," was rejected because apparently K had not been questioned con-
cerning this incident. Whether had he been questioned C would have been
allowed to testify does not, of course, appear. In a suit on a fire policy, the
plaintiff, as witness, may be asked whether he did not sutbmit a sworn proof
of loss in which he asserted that an engine was his property, which he now
says was not his, and in which le denied that insurance had been taken in
other companies on the property covered by the policy in suit, the questioner
promising to follow with proof that such additional insurance had been taken.
"For the purpose," says Mitchell, J., "of testing the truthfulness of his
present testimony, the other was sufficiently a part of 1ie same transaction.'" 
EFFECT OF PROVING THE PERJURY.
Commission of a past perjury does not so far discredit the witness, as to
warrant the statement by the court to the jury, that the testimony standing
alone is unworthy of their credit, and that only such parts of it as are cor-
roborated by circumstances or by credible witnesses, should be believed by
them. The jury may find the witness credible without corroboration, de-
spite his admission of an earlier perjury.
4
CONVICTION OF CRIME.
That the commission of other improper acts than perjury, or subor-
nation of perjury, indicates a tendency to untruthfulness, is the assumption
of those cases which decide that a conviction of such acts may be put in
evidence in order to impair the credit of the witness with the jury. The
witness's conviction, e. g., of burglary, though he has been pardoned"; of
larceny, 6 of embezzlement, 7 of manslaughter, 8 of other crimes 9 may be
shown, no longer to disqualify him from testifying, but to weaken his credi-
bility. Whether a conviction of anything else than treason, felony, or one
of the crimina falsi conviction of which formerly rendered the convict in-
competent to testify, may now be received for the purpose of impairing
credibleness, does not seem to have been distinctly considered by the re-
'Elliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65. The answer would be "conclusive of the fact, it
being a fact entirely collateral to the issue."
285 Pa. 139; the case is not very clear upon this point.
3McSparran v. Ins. Co., 193 Pa. 184.
4Commonwealth v. Greason, 204 Pa. 64.
5 Howser v. Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 332.
6Eifert v. Lytle, 172 Pa. 356; Bogle v. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. 465.
7 fBuck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486.
sCommonwealth v. Barry, 8 Pa. C. C. 216.
oCommonwealth v. Reece, 28 Pa. C. C. 652; Stout v. Rassel, 2 Y. 334.
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ported cases, I though, in Buck v. Commonwealth,2 it was tacitly assumed
that a conviction for embezzlement, which did not disqualify at common
laW3 , would be provable in order to affect credit. A conviction in another
state4 may be proven.
PROVING CONVICTION.
The proper mode of proving the conviction for embezzlement or any
other crime is the production of the record (or an exemplification of it).
It is the highest and best evidence. So has said Paxson, J.1 The question
to be propounded to the witness for the Commonwealth, was whether "he
had not been (not convicted, but) indicted and tried in this court for em-
bezzlement, and this with a view to affect his credibility." Its exclusion
was approved. "It was the right of the District Attorney to object and ask
the court to rule it out. It was an attempt to prove an alleged fact by in-
competent evidence." It is probable, therefore, that the witness cannot be
compelled to answer, on cross-examination, that he has been convicted, but
probably the question may be put to him, and if he chooses, being the party
defendant, he may answer it. Whether he has been convicted or not, it is
said by Arnold, J., is a fact which no one knows better than the-witness, and
it may safely be left to the trial judge to say whether he will permit the wit-
ness to be questioned concerning it, or not. It might be difficult to obtain
a certified copy of the record of conviction in another state, and to interro-
gate the witness would be convenient and unobjectionable. "If the record
of the conviction and sentence is in the court where the person offers himself
as a witness, the record may be obtained without difficulty and it should be
produced." 7 The court may allow a witness who is not a party to be asked
whether lie has not been convicted. There is no danger to the party, that
the witness will admit a greater degree of culpability than the record could
prove. 8 If the witness denies the conviction, the opposite party must resort
to the record to prove it.9
PROVING DISCREDITABLE FACTS.
Admissions may occur in the trial, by the witness himself or by the
party who calls him, that he has done certain discreditable acts, or has cer-
tain discreditable habits. In an action for the value of goods which had
been stolen by two persons, and sold to the defendant, these two persons,
'Greenleaf Evid., 578; (16 Y 4dition, Boston.)
2107 Pa. 486.
3Schuylkill County v. Copley, 67 Pa. 386.
4Commonwealthv. Barry, 8Pa. C. C.216. The conviction may be used to show
that the witness was not at large during the term of the sentence, for the purpose
of contradicting him, he having said that, during this time, he was constantly at
home. Commonwealth v. Barry, 8 Pa. C. C. 216. This is so, though the witness is
the defendant in a serious criminal case, and the evidence may damage him before
the jury.
"Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486; Commonwealth v. Barry, 8 Pa. C. C. 216.7 Commonwealth v. Barry, 8 Pa. C. C. 216. If the witness denies his identity
with the party convicted, witnesses will be heard to prove that identity; Eifert v.
Lytle, 172 Pa. 356.
OCommonwealth v. Reece, 28 Pa. C. C. 652. The question, however, (and it was
not disapproved) was whether the witness had ever been in prison.
9.1d.
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who had been found guilty of the larceny, but sentence of whom had been
suspended, became witnesses for the plaintiff to prove the delivery of the
goods to the defendant. They admitted that they had stolen the goods.
The court properly instructed the jury that "the witnesses admit that they
are thieves; they have been indicted and pleaded guilty as thieves. Of
course the testimony of a fiarficeps crirninis is always to be received with
caution."' In Seibert's Estate2 a, witness was an admitted prostitute, a fact
which doubtless unfavorably affected the 6ourt's estimate of her credibility,
despite the quotation from the note of Capel Lofft to Baron Gilbert's Evi-
dence; in which the annotator doubts the relation between the vice of in-
continence and that of untruthfulness. The admissions of witnesses for the
Commonwealth that they have -been guilty of acts similar to that imputed to
the defendant, while vot impairing their competency, may affect their credi-
bility. 3 The very fact to be proved by the witness may involve him in some
turpitude. A justice who has taken an acknowledgment of a deed, may
prove the fraudulent inclusion in the deed of land which the grantor did not
intend to pass, and unavoidably affect his credibility.
4
INTERROGATING WITNESS AS TO DISCREDITABLE FACTS.
In Elliott v. Boyles 5 it is said that a question to a witness designed to
elicit from him an admission of a disgraceful or criminal act, e. g., that he
had once committed perjury, should not be allowed. It is also said that if
it were allowed, and his answer denied the act, being concerning a collateral
matter, it could not be contradicted. A witness having been asked whether
he had not robbed Traverse, and having answered negatively, Traverse was
properly not permitted to prove that he had robbed him. 6
PROVING ALIUNVDE THESE FACTS.
Whether the witness has been asked and denied, or not, particular
facts concerning him cannot be shown, in order to lessen his trustworthi-
ness. 7 The reasons frequently assigned are that the witness or the party
calling him would not be prepared to refute every imputation that might be
made against him,8 that on the single question of the credibility of a single
witness, the number of collateral issues to be tried might be very numerous, 9
and to Lowrie, J., must be assigned the distinction of inventing a third,
viz: that if a man has a good home reputation for veracity, the value of
that fact is not overcome by any single crime or even many of them, that he
IRohm v. Borland, 7 Atlan. 171. It was not improper to let the verdict for the
plaintiff, founded on their testimony, stand.
21 Pa. C. C. 229.
sCommonwealth v. Yingst, 18 Pa. C. C. 647. But there can be a conviction upon
their testimony.
4Davis v. Monroe, 187 Pa. 212.
531 Pa. 65. In Stout v. Rassel, 2 Y. 334, a question to the witness whether he
had not been committed to the Cumberland county jail as an accomplice of S. was
properly excluded. A particular offence of which the witness has not been con-
victed, cannot be used to impeach him.6 Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 139.7 Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336.
"Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336; Elliott v, Boyles, 31 Pa. 65; Common-
wealth v. McClain, 4 Cl. 145.
9Elllott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65.
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may have committed, and the investigation, therefore, should be limited to
this reputation.' Hence, discreditable acts of a witness cannot be proven by
his own admissions made out of court. In a contest between two execution
creditors the question is whether one of the judgments has been paid. A
constable testifies that it has been paid out of the proceeds of an earlier
execution. His credit cannot be attacked by evidence that he has said that
while constable he used to assist the justice of the peace; that he could so
write the justice's name that the latter would think that himself had
written it; and that he had, without authority, written the justice's name
to process in his hands. 2 Apparently the former pendency of an indict-
ment against a person for assisting prisoners to escape and for riot and his
fleeing from the state in order to avoid trial, are relevant facts, when the
person becomes a witness. If asked why he left Pennsylvania he assigns
some other reason, proof of the indictment does not become admissible, un-
less the question specified the indictment. The answer given is conclusive. 3
If the defendant, on trial for larceny, is asked.. on cross-examination,
whether he has ever been arrested or charged with any other crime, and he
answers no, he cannot be contradicted; but if he volunteers the statement,
(or makes it in his examination in chief) that he has never been so ar-
rested or charged, the Commonwealth may prove by other witnesses that he
had been charged with larceny and paid the person charging him the value
of the goods alleged to have been taken. 4
CORROBORATION OF DISCRZDITED WITNESS.
The witness appearing discredited, e. g., by a conviction of burglary
and a pardon, he may, even in chief, be permitted to state facts which
would mitigate the distrust of the jury. He may deny that his pardon is
the result of a bargain to procure his testimony. He may state how certain
facts to which he testifies are possible and that he had shown their possi-
bility to certain persons whom he names. He may, e. g., state that he
showed to two persons who visited in a cell in the penitentiary, how com-
munication could be had with the occupants of other cells. 5
IMPEACHMENT BY PROOF OF BIAS.
A tendency to speak untruly may have been revealed by the past con-
duct of the witness, with respect to other matters than those undergoing in-
vestigation. It is further possible to show a relation that would probably
produce a bias, or to show by its expression in words or deeds, that such a
bias exists. The existence of the bias weakens somewhat the reliability of
the testimony, because of the observed frequency with which, not in the
case of the witness in question, but in the case of men generally, a bias is
followed by a perversion of statement.
1id.
2Ramsey v. Johnson, 3 P. & W. 293.
3Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 102. It is said that the witneas should be asked
specifically about the indictment.
4Commonwealth v. Murray, 36 L. I. 392, Hare, P. J.
5Howser v. Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 332.
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THE 'WITNESS A PARTY.
The witness may be the plaintiff or defendant, in a civil suit, or the de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution. His interest in the testimony he delivers
for himself, is of course manifest, and tends to weaken his credit with the
court and jury. It is not error for the court to comment on the effect of the
interest of a defendant in a murder case,' or a rape case, 2 or a case of cor-
rupt solicitation of members of the legislature,3 upon his credibility as a wit-
ness for himself. It is not proper, however, to advise the jury not to believe
the defendant on trial for murder, who has become a witness, unless they
find his -testimony corroborated. It is usual to give this advice, with re-
spect to the testimony of an accomplice, but, says Mitchell, J., "not as to
defendants, and in a case where the prisoner was necessarily the only wit-
ness as to the actual circumstances of the shooting, it put upon him a greater
burden than the law imposes. ' 4 It is difficult to see how a defendant testi-
fying to save his life is under a less temptation to falsify, than an accomplice,
who is not testifying for himself, but against his confederate, and whose tes-
tiniony cannot, though it produces a verdict, directly save him from punish-
ment. Corroboration of the testimony of a party in a civil suit is not neces-
sary to render it credible, 5 and it is not error for the court to refuse to say
to the jury that the evidence of disinterested witnesses should ordinarily re-
ceive more weight * * * if they are otherwise as credible, than the evi-
dence of parties who are directly or indirectly interested in the result.
6
THE WITNESS AN ACCOMPLICE.
When it appears that the witness is an accomplice, he is to a degree
discredited, and it is usual for courts to advise juries not to convict the de-
fendant unless they find that the witness has been corroborated, 7 although
they are not bound to give this advice, and a jury may believe the evidence
without corroboration. 8 "If the testimony of the accomplice," says Paxson,
C. J., "his manner of testifying, his appearance upon the witness stand, im-
press a jury with the truth of his statement, there is no inflexible rule of
law which prevents a conviction." If the trial judge is satisfied, no less
than the jury, that the witness has told the truth, the verdict founded on his
testimony will be allowed to stand.9 The woman on whom an abortion is
committed by a physician, is not an accomplice, and her testimony must be
treated as that of any other witness.' 0 The accomplice may be asked whether
he has not been promised immunity from prosecution if he would testify for
'Onofri v. Commonwealth, 20 W. N. C. 264; Commonwealth v. Pipes, 158 Pa.
25; Commonwealth v. Breyesse, 160 Pa. 451.2 Commonwealth v. Orr, 138 Pa. 276.
3 Commonwealth v. Petroff. 2 Pears. 534.
4Commonwealth v. Pipes. 158 Pa. 25.
5Building Ass'n v. Lyons, 2 Kulp 409.6Platz v. McKean Township, 178 Pa. 601.7Watson v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 418; Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 139;
Cf. Commonwealth v. Bell, 4 Super. 187.
8Cox v. Commonwealth, 125 Pa. 94; Commonwealth v. Craig, 19 Super. 81; Com-
monwealth v. Sayars, 21 Super. 75.
9 Id.
'0 Commonwealth v. Bell, 4 Super. 187.
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the Commonwealth. If he denies, others can be called to prove that lie has
been. He may be asked whether he has not told X that he is to obtain im-
munity, and if he denies, X can be called to prove that he did tell him so.'
RELATIONSHIP.
The relationship of a witness to a party may communicate to him a por-
tion at least of the bias of the party. The plaintiff's or defendant's son or
daughter, father or mother, wife or husband, would, were the case import-
ant, be under an appreciable temptation to prevaricate or lie. Hence, the
fact of this relationship may be educed by cross-examination of the witness2
or otherwise, and the witness's unsuccessful attempt to coerce the defendant,
in an abortion case, (the victim being the witness's sister) to pay a sum of
money in order to avoid a prosecution, may be drawn from her on cross-
examination, 3 as showing the depth of her interest in the prosecutrix, or
possibly, to make probable that revenge for the failure of the attempt at
black-mail, was actuating the witness. "It Nyas an inquiry," says Reeder,
J., "going to the credibility of the witness. The motives, interest, feeling,
prejudices andbias of a witness are all proper subjects of cross-examination."
WITNESS' INTEREST.
The witness's interest in the case may be shown in various ways. His
being a relative of the party may be evidential of this interest. So may his
doing acts of various sorts to promote the party's success in the litigation.
The defendant's witness, e. g., may be asked on cross-examination, in a suit
for the negligent killing of the plaintiff's husband, whether he has handed
money to another person in consideration of the latter's agreeing not to
testify for the plaintiff.4 In a tenant's trespass against the landlord for
improperly distraining, the defendant may prove by others, that two wit-
nesses for the plaintiff had connived with him to assist him to withdraw his
goods from the reach of a distress. 5 It is in the sound discretion of the court
whether to allow proof by witness X, that- witness A, for the plaintiff, has
tried to induce witness B to say certain things in behalf of the plaintiff be-
fore A has been interrogated upon the point. 6 The fact that a witness has
received a gift of money from a party, shortly before the trial, may be
proven, because a bias in favor of the party may be the result, or because
it may indicate the subjection of the witness to the will of the party, but the
incident may be explained by the party so as to make it less suspicious. 7
An expert witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he has re-
ceived a compensation for testifying beyond that allowed to ordinary wit-
nesses.8  A witness might be shown to have threatened another witness, for
the opposite party. The witness may be asked on cross-examination
'Commonwealth v. Craig, 19 Super. 81.
2 Organ Co. v. McManigal, 8 Super. 632; Commonwealth v. Bell, 4 Super. 187.
3Commonwealth v. Bell, 4 Super. 187.
4Fitzpatrick v. Riley, 163 Pa. 65. The answer was, Yes.
"McKinney v. Reader, 6 W. 34.
OKay v. Fredrigal, 3 Pa. 221.
7Enright v. R. R. Co., 204 Pa. 543.
8 Shannou v. Castner, 21 Super. 294.
9Cf. Thomas v. Miller, 151 Pa. 482.
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whether the party for whom he is testifying, did not buy a piece of land from
him, at his instance. This act of accommodation might cause a feeling of
obligation in the witness's mind, which would influence his testimony.'
The witness may reveal his bias by doing something in order to qualify him-
self to testify; by making, e. g., an assignment of his interest in a mortgage
or other property for the purpose of removing incompetency.
2
The attempt of A to induce B to testify untruthfully for X may be
shown in order to show the bias and incredibleness of A, who becomes a
witness for X, but, for some reason the court in Kay v. Fredrigal3 rejected
proof of the attempts because A had not been personally questioned con-
cerning it. The Supreme Court remarked that as such requirement was in
the sound discretion of the trial court, it would not examine into its pro-
priety, not distinguishing between assertive declarations relevant simply as
contradicting present testimony, and words indicative of bias not proved in
order to contradict present testimony. The plaintiff having become a wit-
ness in a suit for injury to hin by the defendant's negligence, may be asked
on cross-examination whether he had not attempted improperly to influence
a juror at a former trial of the same case. "The facts set out in the re-
jected offer were such as, if proved before the jury, would have been an im-
peachment of the character of the plaintiff, and a moral conviction of a mis-
demeanor. They were not only sufficient to affect his credibility, but their
force could not have been readily avoided.' 
4
WITNESS THE EMPLOYEE4Z OF PARTY.
That the witness is the agent, or otherwise is in the employ of the
party for whom he testifies, may be extracted from him on cross-examina-
tion. In a personal injury case, a physician testifying for the defendant that
he called upon the plaintiff shortly after the accident, and discovered no in-
jury, may be asked by the plaintiff's attorney whether he was not the de-
fendant's, (a railroad company's) physician, and, denying that he was, how
often he had been sent by the company to examine people who had been in-
jured by accidents. 5 Such durable employment would beget friendliness for
the company. The fear of losing it would be a motive for serving the com-
pany by his testimony. Detectives who have testified against a defendant
charged with murder, may be cross-examined as to who employed them to
come to the county, whether they came under a contract for fees and ex-
penses, what the contract was, how long the agency with which they are
connected, has been employed in the case; how many men are engaged by
it, what is the amount of their bill, by whom it is to be paid; what are the
nature, amount and kind of service rendered, with whom the contract was
made; whether the agency employed private counsel to prosecute the case,
and, if so, by whom this counsel is to be paid. 6
'Cameron v. Montgomery, 13 S. & R. 128.2
Brant v. IDennison, 43 L. I. 120; Carter v. Trueman, 7 Pa. 315.
33 Pa. 221.
4Beck v. Hood, 185 Pa. 32.
5
Guckavan v. Lehigh Traction Co., 203 Pa. 521.
GCommonwealth v. Farrell, 187 Pa. 408.
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
OTHZR INTE4RXST OF WITNBSS.
A witness for the plaintiff to prove the partnership, in an action against
B, C, and D, as partners, may be asked (the controversy being as to B's
membership in the firm) whether he is a creditor of C and D, so as to dis-
close his interest in having B made liable for the plaintiff's debt, and thus
increase his capacity to be paid by C and D. 1 The declaration of the plaintiff
known to the witness that he intends to divide what he recovers beyond a
certain amount, among certain persons of whom the witness is one, may be
proven. 2  vidence that the witness in an ejectment, for the plaintiff, has an
interest in the land, and therefore in its recovery, may be given in order to
lessen his credibility. 3 The existence of the witness's interest in the question
may be elicited by his cross-examination. 4 The dislike of a witness for a
party, or for a person specially related to the matter in controversy may be
disclosed by his cross-examination. In a sdre fiadas on a municipal lien
to the use of a contractor, the defense being that the work was not properly
done, it may be shown that a witness for the defendant had falsely and ma-
liciously accused the commissioner of highways (whose duty it was to see
that paving contracts were properly performed, and, who, if the. defendant's
contention was correct, had neglected to do his duty) of corruption (in con-
nection with the very paving of which that of whose cost the scre fadas seeks
recovery forms a part,) by receipt of the fruits of perjury by a clerk.
"This," says Dean, J., "was not an independent fact; not as if the witness
had been asked whether he had not at some time or other, made a false ac-
cusation against Martin (the commissioner); but it was whether he had not
once before, in connection with a part of the work which was the subject of
dispute, made a false accusation against Martin. If he had done so, the
jury might fairly infer his malice continued unabated, and that his testimony
now, which was in effect, an indirect accusation of Martin, was also
prompted by malice; that his attitude in this issue was not solely to dis-
close the truth but to gratify his hatred of Martin." 5
BIAS, GZNERALLY.
It may be said, generally, that questions relevant to show the bias of
the witness are admissible, and the extent to which the examination for this
purpose may proceed rests in the discretion of the judge.6 "A party
against whom a witness is produced has a right to ask him everything which
may, in the slightest degree affect his credit." 7  The evidence of bias may
be rebutted. If, e. g., the bias is alleged to spring from interest, facts tend-
ing to show the absence of interest may be proven. If the interest of a wit-
1Batdorff v. Nat. Bank of Reading, 61 Pa. 179.2 Good v. Good, 7 W. 195. It was proven by another witness.
sRichardson v. Stewart, 4 Binn. 198.
4Ott v. Houghton, 30 Pa. 451. That the witness mistakenly believes himself to
have an interest would affect his credit and could be shown by other witnesses.
But he should first be called and asked respecting any statements made by him,
implying this belief; McAteer v. McMullen, 2 Pa. 32.
OPhiladelphia v. Reeder 173 Pa. 281.
GHuoncker v. Merkey, 102 Pa. 462; Ott v. Houghton, 30 Pa. 451.
1Cameron v. Montgomery, 13 S. & R. 127; Commonwealth v. Bell, 4 Super. 187.
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ness, in certain land, e. g., has been proven by his declarations, it may be
shown that the father of the witness has conveyed the land to a stranger, if
such conveyance tends to negative the son's present interest.' It is not
error, for which the judgment can be reversed, that an offer to show the
bias of a witness, which the court has rejected, was made in the hearing of
the jury. There is no presumption that a rejected offer has prejudiced the
jury against the witness whom the rejected evidence was intended to im-
peach or against the party calling him. 2 But the court may, without error,
require questions designed to affect the credibility of witnesses to be first
submitted in writing to it, in order that their admission may be passed
upon. 
3
DEFECT OF RELIGION.
It is not clear that the common law incompetency founded on defect of
religious belief has disappeared under modern legislation. If it has not, it
is possible for a party to choose not to exclude a witness altogether on ac-
count of this defect but to make it a ground for lessening the credibility of
the witness. The cause of the incompetency is doubtless, the belief that
men without faith in God, the punisher of falsehood, will be less apt to tell
the truth under oath, than men with such a faith. Observation abundantly
discovers that many men without religion will tell the truth on most serious
occasions, while many men with religion will on similar occasions often lie.
No inventory has been taken of the cases in which religious and irreligious
men have respectively told the truth and lied, and no one is qualified to say
what the respective percentages of falsehood and of truth, in the two classes,
are. The defect of religion may be proven, however, by asking the witness
to be assailed, on cross-examination, and, if he denies his defect, by the testi-
mony of others that he has declared that he did not believe in God.
4
INTELLIGENCE OF WITNESS.
Other traits than the moral trait of veraciousness, are involved in credi-
bility. The witness must have had power to observe that to which he testi-
fies He must have the power to remember it. He must have knowledge
of the ordinary symbols by which men express their thoughts. Questions
are therefore relevant to show the capacity and intelligence of the witness. 5
The mental oddities and peculiarities of the witness, his proneness to hallu-
cinations ; to imagining and saying things that have never happened, may be
proven by other persons,6 and, in denial, witnesses may describe the witness
in question, and say that in their opinion, he is sane. 7 His insanity cannot
be proved by the prevalence of reports that he is insane. 8 Questions may be
'Richardson v. Stewart, 4 Binn. 198.2Philadelphia v. Reeder, 173 Pa. 281.
3Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486.4 Commonwealth v. Wright, 7 York 62. Cf. Trickett, Witnesses, p. 43; Quinn
v. Cromwell, 4 Wh. 334.5Huoncker v. Merkey, 102 Pa. 462; Yeager v. Weaver, 1 Leg. Gaz. 156; Com-
monwealth v. Bell, 4 Super. 187.6Bricker v. Lightner, 40 Pa. 199.
7id.
OLancaster County Nat. Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. 407.
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put to the witness himself, for the sole purpose of discovering how he an-
swers them; e. g., concerning his age, where he lives, what his business is,
etc. The inability to answer these intelligently and correctly, might dis-
close a profound mental imbecility which would render him unfit to be
believed.
WILLIAm TRICKETT.
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SYLVA HARPER vs. JOHN
TOLMATH.
Assumpsit-Statute of limitations-Stated
account-Tolling the statute.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Harper agreed to lend money from time
to time, not exceeding $500. He lent in
smus varying from $10 to $25, $30, $40, $50.
He handed memoranda to Tolmath from
time to time showing the sums lent and
the dates of lending. One of these show-
Ing that $415 had been lent, was handed
to Tolmath Jan. 12, 1897. Tolmath kept
a store, at which Harper bought groceries
from time to time. At the foot of the ac-
count of Jan. 12,1897, he appended a state-
ment of his purchases, which amounted to
$144. The last purchase was made Jan.
11, 1897. Another purchase of $4.50 was
made Feb. 3, 1897. Harper brought as-
sumpsit for $415, less $148.50, on Jan. 30,
1903. Tolmath did not dissent from the
accuracoy of the statement but never ex-
pressly assented. The last loan stated in
the account was of $25, made Jan. 10 1897.
JOHNSON, F., attorney for plaintiff.
Definition of "stated" account. Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, 437.
Such an account is one of the class called
mutual accounts, carried down within six
years, where the statute of limitations
does not apply to the items beyond the
six years. These cases rest on the implied
.akowledgment arising from the mutual
Iarge and credit between the parties and
not on the exception in regard to nier-
chants' accounts. McKelvy's Appeal, 72
Pa. 409.
Where there are mutual demands, if any
item of such account be within six years
before the commencement of the suit, such
item is deemed equivalent to a subsequent
promise reviving the debt; it takes the
case out of the statute, and it is imma-
terial whether the parties are merchants
or not, as it goes on the ground of implied
promise. Chambers v. Mark, 25 Pa. 296.
LAUB, attorney for defendant.
The account is barred by the statute ot
limitations. P. & L. Dig., Col. 2667.
The credits to prevent the operation of
the statute, must be authenticated and
proved to have been intended as a. pay-
ment on the account. Chambers v. Mark,
25 Pa. 296.
One item of an account within six years
will not draw after it other items beyond
six years so as to protect them from the
operation of the statute, unless there have
been "mutual accounts" and reciprocal
demands between the parties. Kimball
v. Brown, 7 Wendell 322.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
All actions upon accounts and upon the
case (other than such accounts as concern
the trade of merchandise between mer-
chant and merchants, their factors or
servants) shall be commenced and sued
within six years after the causes of such
action or suit, and not after. P. & L.
Digest, vol. 1, col. 2667.
It is a necessary inference from the con-
tentions of counsel on the trial of this
case, that the account up to January 12,
1897, was a stated account. "An account
is stated not when it is made out by one
of the parties and submitted to another,
but when it is accepted by the other, and
it may be accepted, not merely expressly,
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but tacitly, by not dissenting in a reason-
able time." Trickett on Limitation, sec.
269; Beaven v. Cullen, 7 Pa. 281.
If we can say that the account of Janu-
ary 12, 1897, was the last stated account,
then it is undisputable that the statute
of limitation would be a bar to the action
and no recovery could be had. The only
question remaining to be decided is: Can
we recover in the purchase of February
8, 1897, in such a way as to take the stated
account out of the statute?
"One item of an account within six
years will not draw after it other items
beyond six years so as to protect them
from the operation of the statute unless
there have been mutual accounts and re-
ciprocal demands between the parties."
Kimball v. Brown, 7 Wendall 322.
When one has an account against an-
other the whole or a part of which is
older than six years, he can not take it all
out of the statute by merely entering a
credit. The credit to have that effect
must be authenticated and proved to
have been intended as a payment on the
account. Chambers v. Marks, 25 Pa. 296.
It must plainly appear, and not be a
matter of conjecture merely, that the pay-
ment was made on account of the very
debt which is in dispute. This principle
was well settled in Burr v. Burr, 2 Casey
284. Certainly an independent account
standing in the books of the debtor
against the creditor amounts to nothing
at all.
Take the case in hand for an illustra-
tion of the principle. There is a statutory
bar to the plaintiff's cause of action. To
remove this bar, Harper relies upon a
purchase of groceries from Tolmath, made
within six years before the commence-
ment of the suit. To sustain the last
purchase, he gives no evidence of an ex-
press agreement to show that it was a pay-
ment on the account in suit. This is the
very cornerstone of the superstructure,
and if it has any inherent weakness, the
action can not be supported by it. And
here we are compelled to say that the
evidence was too vague and uncertain to
establish the fact that the last purchase
was a partial payment on the account in
question.
The plaintiff having sued for the full
amount, including the last purchase of
February 3, 1897, for $4.50, which is within
the statutory peiod, and no tender hav-
ing been made, we will, therefore, enter
judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of
$4.50. MvfORGAN S. KAUFMAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If the action is in substance for money
lent, there being no dispute as to the
amount of it, the only question is, does the
statute of limitations bar a recovery? The
sum last lent, was lent on or before Jan.
12, 1897. The action was begun Jan. 30,
1903, eighteen days too late.
An hccount was given to Tolmath on
Jan. 12, 1897, stating the sums lent. He
did not expressly admit its accuracy, but
during the following eighteen days re-
mained silent. Now, while silence, under
such circumstances, may be an admission,
(Darlington v. Taylor, 3 Gr. 195,) it is not
one of the kind which will toll the statute.
We recall no case in which it has been
held that the assent to the existence of a
debt implied by the silence of the debtor
when charged by the creditor with owing
it, is sufficient to remove the statutory bar,
Verrier v. Guillon, 97 Pa. 63; Cf. Johns
v. Lantz, 63 Pa. 324; Peters' Estate, 20
Super. 233.
There is another point of view from
which to contemplate the facts. It is pos-
sible for an account rendered to be con-
verted into an account stated, by the ac-
quiescence in its accuracy by the person
to be charged, and an account stated is
itself the foundation of an action. A suit
can be maintained upon it, when none
could be on the original transactions which
have been incorporated into the account.
1 Am. &Eng. Ency. 442. The debtor's ac-
quiescence in the correctness of the ac-
count, which it has turned into an account
stated, need not be in writing, nor even
express: Id. 445. An account of money
lent has, so far as we know, never been
treated in Pennsylvania as an account
stated, nor does any case of this State hole
that an account can be made "stated" by
the assent to its verity inferred from non-
dissent for a certain time. Cf. I P. & L.
Dig. 18, et seq. We cannot adopt the
theory that the assent to the account was
not complete for 18 days, and therefore
that the account was "stated" less than
six years before the bringing of the suit.
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It would be useless to hold that silence
could not toll the statute of limitations,
with respect to an action on the transac-
tions embraced in the accouut, if the ac-
count itself could be made the foundation
of an action in which exactly the same
sums could be recovered. We regret that
the learned court below has not found it
advantageous to consider the interesting
question here presented.
Judgment affirmed.
ROBBINS vs. FIDELITY TRUST CO.
Trusts and trustees-Deed of trust--evo-
cation-Evidence to prove incapability
of issue to defeat trust inadmissible.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Five years ago complainant by deed
conveyed to defendant a piece of land to
hold in trust for ccmplainant and his wife
duriug their joint lives and then over in
fee to any children resulting from their
marriage upon the latter attaining the age
of twenty-one; there have been no chil-
dren resulting from marriage. Complain-
ant and his wife now join in bill to have
trust set aside. Evidence was offered to
prove his wife incapable of having chil-
dren; husband is forty and wife thirty-
five.
HASSERT and BRADDocK for complainant.
This being a passive trust, may be ter-
minated at any time at the will of the
cestui que trust. Bustor v. Tasker, 135 Pa.
110; Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 492.
Evidence of incapability of issue being
admissible, and this being shown, the sub-
.equent gift fails and the trust is revo-
(,able. Second edition Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, vol. 24, p. 419.
FERGUSON for defendant.
There being no fraud, accident or mis-
take, trust will be sustained in favor of
beneficiaries. Potter v. Fidelity Ins. Co.,
199 Pa. 360; Fredericks' Appeal, 52 Pa. 338;
Reese, et al, v. Ruth, 13 L. -& R. 434;
Greenfield's Est., 14 Pa. 489.
Any offer of evidence to show incapa-
bility of issue is inadmissible. Cited also
Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531; Rynd v.
Baker, 193 Pa. 486.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The grounds on which it is sought to set
aside the deed of trust are: (1) Mistake.
(2) It heing testamentary. (3) That inas-
much as the possibility of his wife having
issue was extinct, and inasmuch as there
could be no person entitled in remainder,
under the terms of the deed in trust the
trust ought to be terminated upon the
joint request of the settler and the only
possible beneficiary, the wife.
1. With regard to the averment of mis-
take, the evidence fails to establish it, had
it been otherwise. There are two distinct
acts of ratification of the deed which
would preclude the plaintiffs from now
impeaching it. Although the settler
might not-have comprehended its full sig-
nificance and effect when he executed it.
(1) The deed of trust was executed ns
long ago as 1899 and no attempt was made
to impeach it. This fact alone implies
that the settler and the life tenant were
fully aware of its contents. (2) On the
contrary, having acquiesced in it for five
years, itself involved a recognition, and
the affirmance of the trust was to amount
to an assertion that the deed correctly
represented the intention and the object
of Robinson. Hewitt's Appeal, 55 Md.
517; Wollaston v. Tribe, Law Rep., 9 Eq.
44; Nace v. Beyer, 6 Casey 99; Rogers v.
Higgins, 57 Ill. 245; Eyre v. Potter, 15
Howard 15; Jenkins v. Rye, 12 Wharton
241.
2. The many deeds conveying and set-
tling property contained provisions which
became operative only after the death of
the grantor or the settler, but where a per-
son's interest passes to a trustee, or grantee,
it has never been supposed that such in-
strument were of a testamentary character.
It would be otherwise if it vested no pres-
ent interest, but only appoints what is to
be done after the death of the maker. Tur-
ner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 126; Frederick's App.,
52 Pa. 338.
It is idle to call this a testamentary pa-
per. It passed his entire legal title to the
trustee, with a present interest, he parted
with the property wholly and entirely, re-
serving for himself and wife a life estate.
There is nothing in this deed to indicate
an intention to create a trust to take effect
only after the death of the donor. On the
contrary the interest is clear to create a
present trust in favor of the beneficiaries
and took effect immediately upon the exe-
cution of the deed. The transaction was
complete and the donor was absolutely de-
nuded of his property. Garfield Est., 14
Pa. 489; Eckman v. Eckman, 68 Pa. 460.
Wd now come to a much more serious
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question. Is it competent for the plaintiffs
to prove by medical testimony that Mrs.
Robbins is incapable of bearing children?
It may be couceded that where all the
parties in interest are in being and all are
suijuris, they may agree to terminate the
trust, and if no reason appears for denying
their request a court of equity will termi-
nate the same. Thompson's Est., 10 C.
C. 472; Seipe's Est., 11 C. C. 27; Am. &
Eng. Ency., Vol. 27, 322.
But laying behind this proposition is
the inquiry above propounded, because,
unless there is no possibility of Mrs. Rob-
bins having issue and unless this physical
condition can be lawfully proved in the
way and by the means by which it has
been attempted to be established in this
case, there are persons who might have aR
interest in the trust funds and who, if in
being, would have such interest, and not
in being, the rights which they would
have on coming into being cannot be af-
fected of interfered with. Consequently,
this breach of the controversy turns and
depends upon the answer that may be
given to the inquiry as to whether medi-
cal proof as stated in the record and ob-
jected to by counsel for trustee is compe-
tent and admissible. Mrs. Robbins is 35
years old and husband is 40 years old.
There are some English cases which up-
held and sanctioned the presumption that
a woman of a little older than Mrs. Rob-
bins was incapable of bearing children.
But the more modern .English cases have
not adopted or relied upon this presump-
tion. In .Be Dawson, L. R. 39 Chancery
1). 155; In Re Sayers, 6 E. G. 319, and in
Lawsin's on Presumptive Evidence, page
302, it is said "That the English courts
have acted on the presumption that a
woman beyond a certain age is incapable
of child bearing." No cases can be found
in the American courts in which such a
presumption has been given effect to "at
best such a presumption is speculative."
ft is, as the very term "presumption" im-
plies, a mere inference, not a certainty, and
it would be exceedingly unsafe to permit
property rights to depend upon so precari-
ous a basis. But the proposition here goes
farther. It does not contemplate a reli-
ance on a simple presumption. The physi-
cal condition has been testified to by medi-
cal witnesses who have expressed ancopin-
ion that there was no possibility of the life
tenant being the mother of children. Can
such evidence be received in a court of
justice to effect the devolution of property
or to divest the cause marked out for it to
follow? The admission of such evidence,
as in this case, where the avowed purpose
of the proceeding is to "cut out" or "strike
down" an estate in remainder, would or
might be productive of most disastrous re-
sults. If because of physical degeneracy,
atrophy or decoy a medical man may in a
controversy involving title to an estate,
testify that a woman is incapable of bear-
ing children so that the trust deliberately
created for her benefit during her life only
may be brought at an end with a view of
vesting the absolute interest in her, or so
that the vesting of the remainder acceler-
ated, no one can tell to what length such
a precedent would lead. A surgical opera-
tion extirpating the uterus for instance,
would make it absolutely certain that no
issue could be born. If proof like that un-
der consideration would be admitted upon
what principle could evidence showing
that the operation of the kind indicated
had been performed, be excluded ? And,
if not excluded, what would prevent in-
terested parties from resorting to such or
similar operations if by a resort to them a
mere equitable life estate could be con-
verted into an absolute interest? It is
wholly immaterial whether the inability
to bear children arises from natural or ar-
tificial causes. In my opinion it is not
the cause but thefact that alone controls
the question, and the single fact to which
the law looks at is death. The evidence
is inadmissible.
The testimony of the medical witnesses
being excluded, there is nothing on the
record to show that there may not be
children born who would be entitled un-
der the deed of trust to the estate in re-
mainder.
The bill therefore is dismissed.
DAVID E. KAUFn.AN, .
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The land was once Robbins'. He con-
veyed it to the defendant in trust for him-
self and wife during their lives and the
life of the survivor, and then in trust to
convey to any children that might reach
the age of 21 years.
After five years, Robbins and wife file
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this bill to procure the annulment of the
deed. For what reasons?
That the settlement was without con-
sideration is not sufficient. Persons are
allowed to make gifts, and a gift, once
made, is usually irrepealable. It cannot
matter whether the gift is directly to the
donee, or whether it is to an intermediary
termed a trustee. Potter v. Fidelity Ins.
Co., 199 Pa. 360.
That the conveyance might have been
made subject to revocation, is incontest-
able. The mere fact that such a power is
not reserved, is not proof that it was
omitted by mistake, so as to justify the re-
formation of the deed by the insertion of
it. The gratuitousness of the deed and
the nature of the beneficiaries might make
easier the conclusion from other evidence
that there was an oversight in failing to
provide for revocation, but there must be
this other evidence. Kreft v. Neuffer,
202 Pa. 558.
The settler has reserved a life interest
for himself. This is not proof that the in-
strument was intended to be testamentary
and therefore, that it is revocable. Had
it been intended to be revocable, the
adoption of any other form than that of a
will was unnecessary. The delivery of
the paper to the persons named as trustees
was unnecessary. To postpone the vest-
ing of an interest in another, till the death
of the grantor, is not inconsistent with the
irrevocable operation of the instrument
before his death. Rynd v. Baker, 193 Pa.
486; Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531;
Fellows' Appeal, 93 Pa. 470; Eckman v.
Eckman, 68 Pa. 460; Knowlson v. Flem-
ing, 165 Pa. 10.
The deed secures the benefits of the
laud to the wife, should she survive the
husband. This was an appreciable and
commendable object, fully justificatory of
the creation of the trust. It also makes
provision for possible children, an equally
reasonable and laudable object. The con-
veyance was by no means purposeless. It
is true that the wife is willing to forego
her interest, but the potential children
have not renounced their interest in it.
It is true that children do not exist.
They may never exist. But if they did
exist, it would remain uncertain until
they reached the age of 21 years, whether
any of them would ever attain that age.
The possibility that they would not, would
be a feeble justification for annulling the
trust. The double possibility that there
may never be children at all, and that, if
there should be, they may, none of them,
reach majority, would be almost as feeble
a justification.
The offer of evidence that issue of the
marriage is impossible, is irrelevant. That
such issue is not possible, or is highly im-
probable, is not established. We cannot
consider this possibility or probability.
The principle has not been recoguized
that a gratuitous trust in favor of con-
tingent remaindermen is annullable at the
option of the settler. Reese v. Ruth, 13
S. & R. 434.
No reason has been suggested for annul-
ling the deed of settlement.
Appeal dismissed.
GOUGER'S ESTATE.
.otes--Liability thereon for a promise in
aid of a charity-Consideration-In-
ducement of others to subscribe- Work
begun or responsibility incurred on faith
of promise-Effect of death of promisor
where no responsibility is incurred nor
others have been induced to subscribe.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The pastor of the First M. E. Church
announced to his congregation, one Sun-
day, that during the next two weeks
he would call on them, and for the pur-
pose of raising $20,000, with which to
erect a church, would solicit promissory
notes, payable in four months. He called
on several, getting notes ranging from $25
to $1,000. He then called on Gouger, who
gave a note for $800, payable to the First
M. E. Church or order. He then obtained
thirty notes from others, ranging from
$250 to $1,250. Within two months after
making the note Gouger dies. Four
months after his death, the notes aggre-
gating $22,400, a contract was made for the
erection of a church for $20,000. It was
estimated that the furnishing of the
church would cost $5,000. Before the
auditor distributing Gouger's estate, the
church claims payment of the note.
McALEE for plaintiff.
A moral obligation is a sufficient con-
sideration to support an express promise.
Chanlbers v. Calhoun, 6 Harris 13; Edin-
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boro Academy v. Robinson, 1 Wright 210;
Harts' Estate, 7 W. N. C. 162; Kelfen-
stein's Estate, 27 P. F. Smith 331.
The mutual promises of subscribers con-
stitute a valid consideration. Harts' Es-
tate, supra; Edinboro Academy v. Robin-
son, supra.
The promise is irrevocable after accept-
ance. Kelfenstein's Estate, 27 P. F. Smith
331..
The fact that a contract was to be per-
formed in whole or in part after death of
promisor does not render it incapable of
enforcement. Presson's Estate, 6 D. R. 23.
BARNER for defendant.
Death of either party before acceptance
of an offer causes the offer to lapse and
constitutes a withdrawal. Remensnyder
Adm'r. v. Gans, 110 Pa. 19; Helfenstein's
Estate, 77 Pa. 328.
There is no right of action on such a
promise unless legal liability has been in-
curred upon the faith of the promise. Lip-
pincott's Estate, 21 Pa. Superior 214.
Notes for charitable purposes must be
accepted by the trustees of the charity
and there must be a promise or engage-
ment on their part in order to make sub-
scription binding. Phipps v. Jones, 20
Pa. 260; Remensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa. 19.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Gouger gave a promissory note for $800
to the pastor of the First M. E. Church.
The note was made payable to the church
four months from the date it was given.
Within two months after making the note
Gouger died. Now the question might
arise as to whether or not the note had
been accepted by the First M. E. Church
before Gouger's death. A note is but an
offer and the death of the maker before
acceptance is a countermand, and the
amount is not recoverable. Helfenstein's
Estate, 110 Pa. 328. We are of the opinion
that even though the note had been ac-
cepted by the church, that the only
question in this case to be determined is,
whether the promise of the decedent was
founded upon a legal consideration. A
promise in aid of a charity will not be sus-
Jained by the moral obligation alone
which underlies it. Like any other volun-
tary undertaking the question of its per-
formance rests wholly with the conscience.
A legal consideration attachea only when
work is begun or responsibility incurred
upon the faith of the promise. Stokes'
Estate, 9 W. N. C. 439. Now, we do not
think that any work had been begun, nor
any responsibility incurred. So far as we
know no person was induced to subscribe,
by the fact that the decedent had promised
to contribute. Even if the promise of the
decedent did induce the later subscrip-
tions, we shall still raise a consideration
which would be complete only when the
fund was full, or when operations were
begun under it. At any time short of
either event as it might first happen the
decedent could withdraw his offer, and his
death within the period would work a with-
drawal by which his personal representa-
tives would be bound. Helfenstein's Es-
tate, 77 Pa. 328; Remensnyder Adm'r. v.
Gans, 110 Pa. 19; Stokes' Estate, 14 Phila.
C. (. 251. In Lippincott's Estate, 21
Super. 214, they go so far as to hold that
where a subscription in writing to the
erection of a church made by a decedent
in his life time cannot be enforced although
there is oral evidence that he said that he
would pay instalments at certain dates,
when there is nothing to show that the
agreement was made for a consideration,
or that other subscriptions were made on
the faith of it, or that the construction of
the church was begun on the faith of it.
From the statement of facts in this case,
we cannot see where any of the other sub-
scribers were influenced by decedent's act.
There being large collections made both
before and after his subscription. Neither
can we see where any work had been
started or any responsibility incurred upon
the building of said church. And these
facts being necessary to constitute a con-
sideration where no other exists, we
hereby enter judgment for defendant.
SPENCER, 3.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The promise of Gouger to pay $800 is
prima facie gratuitous. It appears that
other persons were giving notes for vari-
otis sums for the erection of the church,
but it does not appear that Gouger had
knowledge of any of these, and was by
them induced to make the note in suit,
nor that any others had knowledge of, or
were induced by Gouger's subscription, to
give their respective notes. Thirty notes
were secured since Gouger's, but it is not
made apparent that the maker of any one
of them knew that Gouger had executed
one.
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The making of the contract in reliance
upon the Gouger note, would have fur-
nished a consideration. The church had
not bound itself to Gouger to erect the
building, should it secure $20,000. Each
note must be regarded as an offer, con-
ditioned on the procuring of enough simi-
lar offers to make $20,000 attainable, and
designed to be binding when accepted by
the church.
Before the condition was fulfilled, and
before the church, by entering into con-
tracts or otherwise, indicated its accept-
ance, Gouger died. As the learned court
below has said, this death revoked the
offer. It could not be subsequently ac-
cepted, either by new subscribers or by
the church itself. Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa.
260; Stokes' Estate, 14 Phila. 251; Helfen-
stein's Estate, 77 Pa. 328.
Judgment affirmed.
